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Volume 7 Chicago • Illinois Number 2
Mr. Peter Fiszpatrick delioering his lecture on Chief Justice
Edward Douglass White.
Edward Douglass White
[In April, the Law School sponsored a lecture by
Mr. Peter Fitzpatrick, a distinguished member of the
Chicago Bar, on Chief Justice Edward Douglass
White. Mr. Fitzpatrick's paper follows.]
When Wilson named Brandeis to the Supreme
Court seven past presidents of the American Bar Asso­
ciation testified against his confirmation. Ex-president
Taft wrote to his wife: HI hope White will not end
his judicial career with an apoplectic fit caused by
the nomination."! At about this time Brandeis con­
ferred with White. Perhaps, because the opposition
to Brandeis recalled to White's memory the charge
of bribery that once had been leveled against him
when he fought the Louisiana Lottery, he immediately
accepted Brandeis and insisted that Brandeis should
look on him not as the Chief Justice but as a father.
Following this meeting, in circulating a draft opinion,
Brandeis wrote on the copy to be delivered to White,
"Father Chief Justice." In returning the draft opinion,
White showed appreciation of the spirit of the ex-
Continued on page 34
GOVERNOR STRATTON
ON LAW DAY
May 1, 1958, was designated "Lau: Day-USA" by
Presidential and Gubernatorial proclamation. On that
date, the Honorable William G. Stratton, Governor of
Illinois, delivered a public lecture at the University,
as the principal feature of the Law School observance
of Law Day. Governor Stratton's address follows.
Continued on page 19
Cooernor Stratton delivering his Law Day Lecture in Breasted
Hall.
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The Hinton Competition
The final round of the Hinton Moot Court Com­
petition was held last month. The Hinton Competition
is a student-administered moot court program, de­
signed to supplement the moot court arguments in
which all students participate during the first-year
tutorial course. The School awards prizes to the win­
ning team, and the team which represents the Law
School in the national moot court competition is
selected from among those participating.
This year, the Bench for the final round was com­
posed of the Honorable David L. Bazelon, Judge of
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum­
bia, the Honorable John S. Hastings, Judge of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
the Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28, Justice of
the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Left to right, The Honorable John Hastings, Judge of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, The Honorable
Walter V. Schaefer, JD'2B, Justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court and The Honorable David Bazelon, Judge of the U.S.
The case argued was Commissioner of Internal Rev­
enue v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (C.A. 7, 1956). Acting
as counsel for the Commissioner were C. John Am­
stutz, of Youngstown, Ohio, A. B. Oberlin College;
Robert T. Cornwell, of Oklahoma City, A.B., Central
State College; and Robert L. Reinke, of South Bend,
A.B., Wabash College. Appearing for the taxpayer
were Morton A. Brody, of Auburn, Maine, A.B., Bates
College; E. Gene Crain, of Costa Mesa, California,
A.B., Pomona College, Francis J. Gerlits, of Chicago,
Ph.B., University of Notre Dame; and John G. Satter,
Jr., of Sioux City, Iowa, A.B., University of South
Dakota. The latter team was awarded the decision.
During the current year, the chairman of the Moot
Court Committee, which conducts the Hinton Com­
petition, has been Robert T. Cornwell.
Court of Appeals [or the District of Columbia, who comprised
the court which heard the final argument of the Hinton Moot
COU1't Competition.
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The final argument in the Hinton Competition begins.
Finalists in the Hinton Competition, left to right, the team of:
Clarence J. Amstutz, [r., of Ohio, A.B., Oberlin College; Rob­
ert T. Cornwell of Oklahoma, AB., Central State College;
and Robert L. Reinke of Indiana, A.B., Wabash College.
Recognition- Organizational
Picketing and Right-to-Work Laws
By BERNARD D. MELTZER
Professor of Law,
The University of Chicago Law School
[From a speech delivered to the Labor Committee
of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Indus­
try. Reprinted, with permission, f1"01n the January,
1958, issue of the Labor Law [oumal, published by
Commerce Clearing House, Chicago.]
A recurring problem of policy is the reconciliation
of the interests of individuals and those of groups
which are favored by the law because they meet, or
at least are thought to meet, important social needs.
It is this problem which underlies the controversy
about the two topics which I have been asked to dis­
cuss - ( 1) recognition and organizational picketing,
and (2) the so-called "right-to-work" laws. Accord­
ingly, before turning to these topics, I want briefly
to remind you of the general framework for reconcil­
ing group and individual interests which has heen
embodied in our national labor policy.
The Wagner Act, closely following the analogy of
political elections, embodied the principle of free
choice by the individual employee and the principle
of majority rule. It also provided for the establish­
ment of election machinery for determining the em­
ployees' uncoerced preferences with respect to repre­
sentation. The Taft-Hartley Act, without disturbing
those provisions, made it plain that the principle of
free choice meant that the right to reject a bargaining
representative was entitled to the same respect as
the right to select one. The Taft-Hartley Act, like
the Wagner Act, entitles a union to bargaining rights
only if it has the uncoerced support of a majority of
the employees in the unit. In a. Board-conducted elec­
tion, a majority of those voting is in general entitled
to speak for the entire unit.
The bargaining agent, under the majority rule prin­
ciple, has broad and exclusive authority in negotiating
the terms and conditions of employment. The em­
ployer must bargain with the representative and with
no one else. The interests of the individual and of
smaller groups within a bargaining unit are thus sub­
ordinated to, and may be sacrificed to, the interests
of the entire group, subject only to the representa­
tive's duty of fair representation of all employees,
Continued on page 45
Winners of the Hinton Competition, the team of, left to right,
Morton A. Brody of Maine, A. B. Bates College; Francis J.
Gerlits of Chicago, Ph.B., University of Notre Dame; E. G.
Crain of California, A.B., Pomona College; and John G. Satter,
lr., of Iowa, A.B., University of South Dakota.
4 The Law School Record Vol. 7, No.2
The Class oj I938
by RICHARD JAMES STEVENS, JD '38
It looks like the Class of 1938 has grown into a
group of good, solid, tax-paying, child-rearing, mort­
gage-plastered citizens. Of course this conclusion is
based on the incomplete evidence of thirty-eight ques­
tionnaires returned. Perhaps some of our experts in
the analysis of statistical evidence, such as Harry Kal­
ven, Jr., who has been working night and day, through
courtesy of the Ford Foundation, on a massive study
of the functioning of the jury system, or Paul Schwie­
bert, Director and Actuary for United Insurance Com­
pany, can point out the glaring fallacies in this con­
clusion. As of now, however, on the evidence at
hand, that's about the way it looks.
Take this matter of offspring, for example. The
thirty-eight who were foolhardy enough to answer
the questionnaire, admitted to a total of eighty-seven
children and two grandchildren-an average of 2.34
descendants each. Frank Mahin is the only proud
grandfather in the class, boasting of two grandchil­
dren-one girl and one boy. Three of us are neck and
neck in the children derby, with five each-Thomas
Megan, Conway Ashton and Richard James Stevens.
Lee Shaw, Melvin Cohen and John Lynch are right
on their heels with four youngsters each. Nine are
in the "show" position, with three each-Bob Mac­
donald, Frank Mahin, William Pettigrew, Homer
Rosenberg, Donald A. Morgan, Arthur B. Sachs, John
Canright, Harry Kalvin, Jr., and Lydia Levinson
Rashman.
Apparently, we like the practice of law. Twenty
of us are active in the practice and almost all of the
twenty are either partners or have their own indi­
vidual practice. Sixteen of the twenty are in firms.
Robert Macdonald (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson of Chicago); Henry Hill (Mayer, Friedlich,
Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt of Chicago); Richard
F. Mullins (Am & Mullins of Wichita); Melvin
Cohen (Leonard M. & Melvin Cohen of Chicago);
Lee C. Shaw (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Gerald­
son of Chicago); Harry Schulman (Perlman, Rubin
& Schulman of Chicago); Donald A. Morgan (Davis,
Morgan & Witherell of Peoria); Willis E. Parkinson
(Parkinson & Stewart of Glenwood Springs, Colo­
rado ); Zalmon Goldsmith (Petersen & Goldsmith of
Aurora); Sheldon E. Bernstein (Newmyer & Bress
of Washington); Irwin J. Askow (Askow and Stevens
of Chicago); Maurice Rosenfield (Friedman, Zoline
& Rosenfield of Chicago); John R. Lynch (Robertson
& Lynch of Lafayette); Marcus Cohn (Cohn & Marx
of Washington); Robert A. Crane (Hubachek & Kelly
of Chicago); Richard James Stevens (Askow and
Stevens of Chicago).
Four of us have our own firms: Franz M. Joseph
(New York); Homer E. Rosenberg (Chicago); Arthur
B. Sachs ( Chicago) ; John R. Canright ( Lanikai,
Oahu, Territory of Hawaii).
Six of us are prominent in the insurance field:
Frank M. Mahin is Branch Claim Manager for Lum­
bermen's Mutual Casualty Company in Louisville;
Conway A. Ashton is office attorney for Beneficial
Life Insurance Company, Salt Lake City; Stanford
Miller is Vice President of Employers Reinsurance
Corporation in Kansas City, Missouri; Walter F. Ber­
dal is Claims Manager for Allstate Insurance Com­
pany, Atlanta Branch; Paul W. Schwiebert is Director,
Vice President and Actuary for United Insurance
Company of America; John F. Shallenberger is Man­
ager of Capitol Life Insurance Company in Denver,
Colorado.
Six of us have positions with corporations: Thomas
1. Megan is General Attorney for the Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Railroad Company in Chicago;
Warren R. Kahn is Vice President of Harry Alter
Company in New York; Roger A. Baird is General
Attorney and Assistant Secretary for Kimberly-Clark
Corporation in Neenah, Wisconsin; Myron L. Duhl is
Assistant Secretary of Ekco Products Company in
Chicago; William S. Pettigrew is Patent Attorney for
General Motors Corporation in Detroit; Robert E.
Haythorne is counsel for American Marietta Company
in Chicago.
Only two of us teach law full time: Quintin John­
stone is Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law
School; Harry Kalven, Jr., is Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, in addition to being Director
of the Law School Jury Project. Several of us have
dabbled in teaching on occasion: Henry L. Hill has
lectured on Aviation Law, his specialty, at North­
western University, Franz Joseph has been Professor
of Law at Institut de Droit Compare; Irwin J. Askow
has taught Business Law at Northwestern Univer­
sity; Maurice Rosenfield has lectured at the University
of Chicago Law School.
Only three of us presently are active in government
work, but their activity has been enough to make up
for the rest of us. Marie Cole Berger has been Assist­
ant Solicitor with the Department of Agriculture;
Senior Attorney for the OPA; active in the office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation of the State De­
partment; Acting Chief of the Distribution Section
of UNRRA: attached to the Headquarters of the
UNRRA Balkan Mission at Cairo, Egypt; in Decem­
ber of 1944 she was wounded by tank fire in Athens.
She served as Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of
Dependent Area Affairs and later was appointed At­
torney for the Point Four Program in the Near East
and Africa Region, finally serving as Chief of the
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ALUMNI NOTES
We note with great pleasure the continually in­
creasing number of alumni who have become mem­
bers of the judiciary. AXEL J. BECK, JD'22, of Elk
Point, South Dakota, has been appointed United
States District Judge. Judge Beck, who has practiced
law in South Dakota since his graduation, has been
Republican National Committeeman from that state
for the past ten years. E. HAROLD HALLOWS,
JD'30, has been appointed a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. Justice Hallows, formerly a mem­
ber of the firm of Hoffman, Hallows and Cannon, is a
past president of the Wisconsin Bar Association. He
is a member of the House of Delegates of the Ameri­
can Bar Association, and has for many years taught
in the law school of Marquette University.
ARTHUR J. MURPHY, JD'22, recently became a
member of the Illinois Appellate Court. After many
years of private practice in Chicago, Judge Murphy
served as a Judge of the Superior Court of Cook
County. Probably the youngest judge among the
The Fifth Annual Alumni Fund Campaign is now under way.
Shown above are, left to right, [. Gordon Henry, '41, Co­
Chairman; Dwight P. Green, '12, Honorary Chairman; and
Bernard Nath, '21, Chairman.
Class of 1938
East Africa Region. In 1954 Marie was granted the
Rockefeller Public Service Award for outstanding
public service. Under this award she spent approxi­
mately one year in Samoa and other Pacific islands.
Presently she is back in Washington on the staff of
the Regional Director for the Near East and South
Asia of the International Cooperation Administration
as Operations Officer. Quite a colorful career!
Karl E. Lachmann also has had an interesting gov­
ernment career. He was Assistant Solicitor to the
Department of Interior; Special Attorney at the Office
of Price Administration; Chief of International Tax
Section, Fiscal and Financial Branch, Bureau of Eco­
nomic Affairs, United Nations; was in the private
School's alumni is L. HOWARD BENNETT, JD'50.
After practicing in Minneapolis since his graduation,
Judge Bennett recently became a member of the Mu­
nicipal Court of that city. Doubtless the most color­
ful judicial office held by an alumnus is that now filled
by PHILIP R. TOOMIN, JD'26. After an extensive
period of private practice in Chicago, he was recently
appointed a Justice of the High Court of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. His Court currently
sits in Truk, in the Carolines.
At the annual meeting of the Women's Bar Asso­
ciation of Chicago, Professor BERNARD MELTZER,
JD'37, acted as Chairman of a panel discussion of
"Recognition Picketing." Among other participants in
the panel were LEE SHAW, JD'38 and ABNER J.
MIKVA, JD'51.
DONALD L. HESSON, LLM'42, writes that he is
now a member of the English Bar, and in practice as
a Barrister in London, where he occasionally sees
ALBERT H. ROBBINS, JD'23, who has been in prac­
tice in both England and the United States.
Dean Levi at a recent luncheon meeting of New York. The
meeting was arranged by George B. Pidot, '30.
practice of law in Arlington from 1940 to 1943; was
Prosecuting Counsel at the Nuremberg trials; Deputy
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Confer­
ence on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons,
Lake Success, in 1950; was Secretary, Technical As­
sistance Conference on Comparative Fiscal Admin­
istration in Geneva, 1951; and presently is Chief of
International Tax Section Fiscal and Financial Branch,
Bureau of Economic Affairs, United Nations Secre­
tariat. He is a member of the American Economic As­
sociation; American Society of International Law;
National Tax Association; Society for Comparative
Legislation and International Law, England; Societe
Continued on page 54
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The Jury, The Law, and
The Personal Injury
Damage Award
by HARRY KALVEN, JR.
Professor of Law,
The University of Chicago Law School
Director of the Jury Project
(Reprinted with permission from 19 Ohio State
Law Journal 1.58)
A few years ago Professor Jaffe in. one of his cus­
tomarily wise and urbane articles! observed: "I suggest
that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts to­
day is not in the area of liability but of damages." I
think he is right on several counts. First the criticism
of personal injury awards it at least as much con­
cerned today with their level as with their frequency.
Second it is my impression that on the bar's view the
difference between lawyers-at least plaintiff lawyers­
is measured more in terms of what they would get in a
given case than it is in terms of winning or losing.
Again, as a matter of simple arithmetic there is of
course a greater difference between a $30,000 and a
$10,000 verdict than there is between a $10,000 one
and a verdict for the defendant. And finally to pick
up the point Professor Jaffe was most concerned with
-it is selecting the appropriate award level that is the
most troublesome issue in proposals to shift areas of
tort to strict liability compensation schemes."
Professor Jaffe went on in the passage quoted to
wonder why damages received so little attention in
law school study and in the secondary literature on
tort." "Questions of liability," he continued, "have great
doctrinal fascination. Questions of damage-and par­
ticularly their magnitude-do not lend themselves so
easily to discourse. Professors dismiss them airly as
matters of trial administration. Judges consign them
uneasily to juries with a minimum of guidance, occa­
sionally observing loosely that there are no rules for
assessing damages in personal injury cases. There is
a.nalogy for this situation in Jerome Frank's complaint
that fact finding, though of paramount importance, is
neglected by teachers who devote themselves too ex­
clusively to appellate law. This may reflect not so
much their judgment of relative importance (as Judge
Frank supposes) as the relative adaptability of the
subjects to conceptualization. And so it probably is
with the subject of damages."
Once again I think he is right. And I would add
only this-the reason the law of damages escapes ready
conceptualization is because it is so pre-eminently jury
law. Damages even more than negligence itself is law
written by the jury. I would suggest therefore that it
is the absence of data as to jury behavior on damage
issues which places an important topic generally be­
yond our reach.
The purpose of this comment is not to supply the
necessary data. The Jury Project at the University of
Chicago Law School has for several years now been
studying the jury empirically.' It has progressed far
enough to reaffirm that the jury's handling of damages
is an extraordinarily interesting topic. It has also pro­
gressed far enough to realize that it would take a full
life time of empirical research to document the many
nuances in this corner of jury law. In any event the
Hans Zeisel
project will within the next year or so begin to publish
the results of its inquiries and I shall not attempt to
report them in any substantial way here. I should like
therefore to essay no more than a few reflections on
the topic, in part engendered by my over-all ex­
perience with the project materials and in part by my
experience in teaching torts. And in so doing I shall
frequently step well beyond the project data and in­
dulge in speculation.
This comment then will consider four closely related
points: first the degree of freedom we accord the jury
on damage issues; second, the light that is thrown on
the existing law of damages when, so to speak, it is
Vol. 7, No.2 The Unioersitq of Chicago Law 'School 7
held up against the mirror of jury equity; third, the
role of damages both as an index of the propensity of
jurors with different backgrounds and experience to
see the same matter in different ways, and also its
role as a kind of solvent that makes jury consensus
.
possible in the deliberation process itself; and finally
I should like to touch briefly on the differences be­
tween judge and jury in deciding damages questions.
I
The freedom and discretion of the jury on issues of
damage is in many ways like that of the jury on any
issue. It derives first of all from the institutional
arrangements under which the jury is permitted to
deliberate in private and to report its decision out by
general verdict.
Further the cardinal premise of common law per­
sonal injury damages is that they be not limited by
schedule but be computed de novo for each individual
case. There is in brief no standard man, no reasonable
man afoot in the law of damages." Joined with this
premise is the companion notion that it is the function
of tort damages to make the plaintiff whole: he is not,
that is, to bear any part of his accident loss himself,
if there was a legally wrongful accident." It is this
premise in particular which Professor Jaffe bravely
challenges, but so long as the system accepts these
two premises there cannot be many specific rules of
damages. And the jury is of necessity left free to price
the harm on a case by case basis.
The court's opportunities for control of the jury on
damages are therefore severely limited. Its basic de­
vice is the general damage instruction itself which can
do no more than convey to the jury the large headings
under which it may award damages. Since these are
so broad the chief message of the instructions to the
jury is to tell them how free they are.? Beyond this
the court can only rarely control by excluding evidence
or by withdrawing an item of damage from the jury.
And finally there is its power to set aside excessive or
inadequate awards. The practical trick of using ad­
ditur and remittitur has given some possibility of con­
trol here, but it is today the recognized practice to use
that power sparingly indeed."
Perhaps this has been said too quickly. It is true
that to price a punch in the nose or a broken leg is at
first blush a difficult value judgment. But the law
appears to avoid the impossible here by breaking the
loss components down into subordinate questions of
fact as to medical expense, economic loss, and pain
and suffering. Medical expense and economic loss do
have some objective reality but the warrant to add
pain and suffering gives the jury immediate freedom
to price the injury subjectively. And where, as is so
often the case, there is an issue not only of accrued
loss but of loss in the future the facts as to medical
expense and economic loss become enormously more
ambiguous. And again it is only with the wage earner
that economic loss is reasonably clear. As soon as .the
claimant is a proprietor, a housewife? or a child it is
apparent that the jury's task is substantially less limited
by objective data. The upshot therefore is that the
ambiguities of damages as fact issues add several
degrees of freedom to the [ury."?
If one is tempted to read reasons into institutional
arrangements, as I confess I am, one suspects that the
law recognizes that the computing of damages in­
volves a complex value judgment as well as a literal
determination of fact. And that with damages as with
negligence itself the law intends the jury to legislate
interstitially, to fill out the vague general formula.
On this view the jury's freedom and discretion is not
by default but by preference-preference for the com­
munity sense of values as the standard by which to
price the personal injury. And on this view the jury's
role in setting personal injury damages is not so
different from its role in setting general damages in
defamation.
Could the jury's freedom and autonomy over dam­
ages be reduced without a drastic change in the
system? Let us take a second look at the usual damage
instruction. Today it tends to be a long complex
sentence or two. My impression is that it could be
more effectively communicated so that the jury be­
came more conscious of its assignment to compute
damages by first ascertaining a series of component
sums. But I am not at all certain just what effect this
would have on the jury, if any. It is a major char­
acteristic of the jury's approach to damages that it
does not much concern itself with the damage com­
ponents as an accountant might but searches rather for
a single sum that is felt to be appropriate. Whether
any instruction could turn the jury away from its
gestalt approach to a more explicit concern with add­
ing component sums I do not know. But I do have
a fairly firm impression from our project materials that
the result would be in general to increase damages
rather than to deflate them. If one seriously assesses
the components in a case of any magnitude they are
likely to add up to a surprisingly large figure. I take
it this is one reason why the plaintiff bar sometimes
expresses a preference for the accountant type juror
in a case where damages are substantial and well
documented. And I would suspect also that this is
one secret of the success of Mr. Belli and his col­
leagues-their rhetoric at the blackboard is directed to
stimulating the jury to compute. Not simply sentiment
but arithmetic seems to be on their side under the
existing rules.
Other considerations come to mind.'! It is possible
that use of special verdict procedures on damages
would force the jury to be more explicit in weighing
the component items.P It is my impression that the
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special verdict is much less frequently used on dam­
ag�s however than on liability. And it is not unlikely
that the jury could easily escape the special verdict
control and tailor its specific damage answers after
the fact so as to make them accord with the "felt"
appropriate overall sum.l" Similarly one wonders
whether radical changes in trial procedure whereby
for example the jury would not be instructed on the
damage issue until they had completed their decision
on liability would make a diflerence.l" One matter that
has impressed us is the sheer time gap between the
time the jury hears the damage instruction and the
first time they are ready to turn seriously to it in the
deliberation."
Consideration of the damage instruction suggests
one other interesting point that has in recent years
broken through on the appellate level. To what de­
gree do the instructions fail to control because they
remain silent? This has two aspects. First should the
court like a good teacher not only tell the jury what
it is to do but also anticipate certain probable mis­
understandings and negate them in advance? In two
wrongful death cases we have been able to study by
post trial interview it is apparent how readily such
misunderstandings can arise. In the one case the jury
simply does not understand that it is not being asked
to place a value as such on human life; therefore the
point arises with some intensity in the deliberation
that any human life must be worth at least $5,000. In
the other case where damages for loss of support were
clearly substantial the jury somehow gets the notion
that damages are a sort of welfare payment based on
minimum subsistence notions rather than the direct
measure of loss of support.l'' The propriety and wis­
dom of the court anticipating such misunderstandings
is of course a controversial matter. I would favor it
here since the general instruction standing alone seems
to expose the jury to needless misconceptions and
nothing more.
The second aspect of the "silent" instruction is more
familiar. Several important and clear damage rules are
normally kept from the jury altogether. Thus they are
not told that his lawyer's fees are not part of plaintiff's
damage; they are not told that interest is not to be
awarded from the time of injury; they are not told
that the award is not subject to federal income taxa­
tion.!" The law on these points is perfectly clear-in
fact it is ironically the only clear part of damage law.
The non-disclosure of the law to the jury raises an
obvious policy dilemma. Undoubtedly in part the non­
disclosure stems from a suspicion that the instruction
will only sensitize the jury and stimulate them to do
something they otherwise might not do-a suspicion
that our study suggests is well founded. IS And in part
it stems, I suppose, from an ambivalence toward the
rules themselves. We are not so sure how we feel about
the plaintiff paying his attorney out of his award. And
"as with contributory negligence we may not mind too
much the jury eroding the rule-? as a crude de facto
reform.
Another detail is suggested by a recent English
case."? Here the judge was trying the issue without a
jury and the question arose as to the propriety of his
considering as precedent awards in other comparable
cases. The trial court thought this improper. The
reviewing court thought it might prove helpful to
the trial judge if done in moderation, but limited its
view to bench trials. The court went on: "It may be
asked: 'Why should a judge have something before
him which a jury would not have?' I am not sure there
is any good reason, except perhaps, that if jurors, new
to the task, are called on to assess damages in a case
such as this, the more one can keep their minds
directed to the actual issues the better." Perhaps it is
hard to escape the conclusion of the English court but
Continued on page 55
From The Silver Collection
An extensive collection of autographed portraits and
letters of Justices of the United States Supreme Court
has been presented to the Law School by Louis H.
Silver, JD'28. A photograph of a portrait of Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase, with a letter from Chief Jus­
tice Chase to a Mr. E. A. Stansbury, is reproduced on
this page. The text of that letter, written shortly
before the presidential election of 1860, when Chase
was Governor of, and a candidate for, Senator from
Ohio, is as follows:
My dear friend,
Nothing in the future is even tolerably clear to me
except the probability, approaching certainty, that
Mr. Lincoln will be our next President, and that by
his election the power of slavery in this country will
be broken. What lies beyond I see not. I hope the
Administration will be Republican, and that faithful
Republicans will be called into the Cabinet, and that
all will be well. To that end I shall honestly, sin­
cerely and earnestly labor. I do not know Mr. Lincoln
personally. All I hear of him inspires confidence in
his ability, honesty and magnanimity. These qualities
justify the best hopes, but we must remember that
he has not been educated in our school, and may not
adopt our ideas, therefore, either in the selection of
men or in the shaping of measures.
As to your own matter, you are enough acquainted
with the course of things in Washington to know that
in appointments from New York, New York Senators
and Representatives and leading men will be prin­
cipally consulted. Where the President has personal
knowledge and personal confidence he may act upon
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Portrait of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, with a letter in his
handwriting. From the Louis Silver Collection recently pre-
seated to the Law School. Further details elsewhere in this
issue.
that, as, were I President, I might in your case; but
aside from such knowledge and confidence, decisions
must be based chiefly on the recommendations of
men nearest the heart of the party. Of course, I
pledge to you that I shall always stand ready to pro­
mote your interests, when I can do so effectively and
without injustice to the claims upon me of citizens
of my own state. I know nothing now in the way of
my aiding any efforts of your friends in New York
regarding the positions you desire; and yet it is too
early to say whether circumstances may not arise
which will prevent me from being of any valuable
service to you.
I have no expectation of occupying any other rela­
tion to the Administration than that of Senator; nor
do I desire any other.
Your references to your own affairs give me pain.
I supposed you had got rid of the pecuniary troubles
you some time complained of. That you have been
faithful to the cause, to your convictions, and to Re­
publican principles I know. Were I so situated as
to act independently, and had the power to give you
a significant proof of my affection, that proof should
not be wanting. But I am only a passenger in the
boat; I bear no command.
To me, a loyal devotion to the cause has proved
a prize of anything but wealth. For ten years I have
given my almost undivided attention to this affair,
and my private interests have suffered greatly. If I
could honorably do so, I would have willingly retired
from all public employment, and given myself to the
more profitable business of private life, in which I
am sure far more enjoyment is to be found than in
public.
Faithfully your friend,
S. P. Chase
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Some Alumni of The Law School Now Practicing tn New York
On the Zeft, Edwin L. WeisZ, JD'19, of Simpson Thacher and
Bartlett. Mr. Weisl is shown with Senator Lyndon Johnson
during his service as Special Counsel to the Senate Subcom­
mittee on the Preparedness of the Armed Forces. (New York
Times Photo)
Monrad C. Paulsen, JD'42, Professor of Law, Columbia Uni­
versity.
George B. Pidot, JD'30, of Shearman and Sterling and Wright.
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A group of the School's younger alumni in New York. Left to
right, seated, Alan C. Swan, JD'57, of Milbank, Tweed, Hope
and Hadley; Frederick A. Yonkman, JD'57, of Winthrop, Stim­
son, Putnam and Roberts; Wilson R. Augustine, JD'57, of the
Office of Mr. Arthur D. Emil; Renata W. Beghe, JD'54, of
Carter, Ledyard and Milburn; William W. Jochem, JD'54,
of Cravath, Swaine and Moore. Standing, Herbert W. Park,
JD'57, of Debeooise, Plimpton and MacLean; Wesley J.
Liebeler, JD'57, of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn; Allen S.
Person, JD'57, of Shearman and Sterling and Wright; and
Charles T. Beeching, Jr., JD'55.
The Honorable Irvin C. Mollison, JD'23, Judge of the U.S.
Customs Court. Before becoming a member of the Court,
Judge Mollison, a member of the class of 1923, practiced in
Chicago for many years, where he served as a member of
the Chicago Board of Education and was, and still is, asso­
ciated with numerous learned societies, and civic betterment
groups.
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Ben Herzberg, JD'22, of Hays, Sklar and Herzberg, a former
Assistant United States Attorney.
Robert H. O'Brien, JD'33. Formerly a member of the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission, Mr. O'Brien was associated for
several years with American Broadcast-Paramount Theaters,
Inc., ultimately as financial vice-president and secretary. He
is now Vice-President and Treasurer of Loeu/e, Incorporated.
Alex L. Hillman, '24, publisher, President of Hillman Periodi­
cals, Inc., formerly Special Counsel, U. S. Senate Committee
on Appropriations, and U.S. Senate Committee of Foreign
Relations; Recipient of Freedoms Foundation Award, Director
of numerous companies.
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Herman Odell, JD'36, a distinguished solo practitioner.
John N. Hazard, JSD'39, Professor of Public Law, Columbia
University, Vice-President of the American Foreign Law As­
sociation, the American Branch of the International Law Asso­
ciation and the Section of International and Comparative Law
of the ABA; an authority on International Law and Soviet
law in particular.
Frank H. Detweiler, JD'31, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore,
Chairman of the Committee on the Surrogates' Courts of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York; member of
the Distribution Committee of the New York Community Trust.
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Charles B. Baker, JD'38, President of Universal Atlas Cement
Company.
Donald B. Cronson, JD'48, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, for­
merly law clerk to Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson.
Byron E. Kabot, JD'41 , formerly law clerk to Mr. Justice
Stanley Reed, now with the International Paper Company.
Sylvester Petro, JD'45, Professor of Law, New York University,
widely known for his work in labor law.
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Bernard D. Cahn, JD'33, who served extensively with the
SEC, was associated with the War Production Board and 1:Jith
Military Government during the war, and is now in private
practice, specializing in SEC matters.
Jerome S. Katzin, JD'41 , at one time Director of the Public
Utilities Division of the SEC, now associated with Kuhn, Loeb
and Company, and active in a number of other business en­
terprises.
Charles E. Brown, III, JD'48, of J. H. Whitney and Company.
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Kent V. Lukingbeal, JD'42, of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushbu,
Palmer and Wood.
George F. James, [r., JD'32, a former member of the Law
School Faculty, now Treasurer of the Standard-Vacuum Com­
pany.
Jorge E. Illueca, JD'55, of Panama City, Panama. Mr. Illueca
is now residing in New York, where he represents his country
on the Security Council of the United Nations.
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Lowell C. Wadmond, JD'24, of White and Case. He has
served, among many other civic activities, as President of the
Metropoiitai: Opera.
John B. Howard, JD'42, Director of the International Training
and Research Program of the Ford Foundation. Before joining
the Foundation, Mr. Howard was a senior adviser in the United
States Department of State. He had served as Special As­
sistant to the Secretary of State, Regional Adviser to the Bureau
of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and in a
variety of other positions.
Roswell Magill, JD'20, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, [ormer
Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury Department.
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CHICAGO, FACULTY PROFILE
Karl Nickerson Llewellyn
A typical day for Karl Nickerson Llewellyn begins
early for it is during the hours before breakfast that
much of his work is done. After preparing coffee,
which he maintains is best done by steeping, he begins
the day's work. Whatever his project, the first draft
of written work invariably is done on yellow, lined,
legal-sized paper, and usually in pencil, a yellow
lead pencil. These implements are important in the
craft of lawyering to Mr. Llewellyn, who is not con­
vinced that an attorney can function as efficiently
on a white, unlined leaf. During the morning and
throughout the day, he fills up several pages with let­
ters to authors of articles he has read, letters to edi­
tors, ideas for lectures or articles, and perhaps poetry.
He produces such a quantity of material that only a
part of it is ever worked into final form.
Much of Professor Llewellyn's working time at
home and in his law school office is spent in prepar­
ing lectures to be presented to his classes. He never
uses old lecture notes, but always reworks the mate­
rial he has in the light of his present thinking on the
subject, adding new material and deleting other. His
constant revision is remarkable since nearly all of
Professor Llewellyn's life in the law has been spent
in teaching. After receiving his LLB from Yale Law
School, he served as an instructor in law while he
completed his work for a JD. He then accepted a
position with the New York law firm of Shearman
and Sterling, although he probably considered his
.
work there to be more of a continuation of his inter­
est in negotiable instrument law than as the start of
a career in the practice of law. While a member of
the firm he had the opportunity to work with the
New York banks in revising the forms which they used
in international trade. From his experience with
banking problems, he developed an interest in letters
of credit and cable transfer questions which has con­
tinued throughout his career and is evident in his
work as the Chief Reporter of the Uniform Commer­
cial Code. After two years, Llewellyn returned to
continue his teaching career at Yale Law School. He
then served on the faculty of Columbia University
where he held the chair of Betts Professor of Law.
He was a guest professor at the University of Leipzig
and Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
In 1951 he [oined the University of Chicago Law
School as Professor of Law in which capacity he is
presently serving.
In the actual presentation of his materials in class,
Karl Llewellyn is much the same today as he was
when he taught his first class in Negotiable Instru­
Continued on page 30
Advancement of the Law
By KARL N. LLEWELLYN
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School
[Reprinted, by permission, from The Student Law­
yer, the Journal of the American Law Student Asso­
ciation, Volume 3, Number 4, April, 1958.]
What one notices first and most about the Law School
of the University of Chicago is the combination of
fire and drive with roundedness and balance. There
is no uniqueness merely in the presence of a large full­
time faculty full of distinguished scholars and teachers.
There is no uniqueness in the development and use of
a varied battery of instruction techniques in addition
to the more usual case-class and occasional lecture.
There is no uniqueness merely in the presence of a
highly select student body, nor in one small enough to
make possible a striking amount of personal contact
and instruction. There is no uniqueness merely in sus­
tained insistence on vision, range, the human back­
ground and the political and social problems native to
sound work in the legal field; neither can uniqueness
be found in sustained insistence on the importance of
the materials and teachings of the other social dis­
ciplines.
Although it can indeed be doubted whether any
other school at all rivals Chicago's stress on theory and
workshop practice in basic lines of legal craftsmanship,
the distinguishing characteristic of the school remains
the way in which that stress is fitted into harmony
with such other attributes as have been mentioned, the
way in which all such things are merged into a work­
ing, rounded whole.
This characteristic becomes most clear if one runs
the eye over the history of American law schools and
notes how each notable advance has tended to come
at one or another high price in exaggeration. The
growing point of the decade or the region has always
been exciting for the teachers concerned and for some
or most of the best of the students; but the bulk of the
class, who need formed and sustained lines of in­
struction, have commonly missed out in regard to
various important matters which were not at the place
and the moment in the focus of conscious attention.
Take for example the huge gain which came from
introducing schools at all. Here was a beginning of
order and of system in legal training, the substitution
of a reckonable course of study for the hap-hazardness
of the older reading-and-apprenticeship approach. It
was another huge gain to develop the full-time teacher,
whose teaching of his students can become his life,
and is in no event merely a by-product or a touch of
Continued on page 28
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Governor Stratton­
Continued from page 1
The opportunity to talk to you here today is one
I have been anticipating for some weeks. It is good
to be here, especially since we are today honoring
the science of law and particularly those persons who
"have chosen careers in law.
As we meet here, we are in a great worldwide strug­
gle of ideas. It is therefore fitting that we should honor
our most priceless heritage-the Rule of Law. Ours
is a government of laws and not of men, because the
founders of this country recognized that the rule of
law and liberty are indivisible. There are many coun­
tries today which do not recognize this principle, and
it is imperative that we maintain eternal vigilance to
protect our heritage.
Aristotle once said that in all well-organized gov­
ernments there is nothing which should be more jeal­
ously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law,
especially in small matters. He added that lawlessness
creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state; just
as the constant repetition of small expenses in time
eats up a fortune. The great philosopher recognized
the importance of Rule by Law. He knew well that
man, the best of beings, when separated from laws
and justice, becomes the worst of all. For justice is
the bond of men, and the administration of justice is
the principle of order in any political society.
"Law," said Cicero, "arises out of the nature of
things." He defined it as right reason which, in ac­
cordance with nature, applies to all men. By its com­
mands, he said, this law summons men to the per­
formance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains
them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibi­
tions always influence good men, but are without effect
upon the bad, Cicero contended. This, we know, is
the expression of a natural law theorist.
On the other hand there is the positivist or legal
realist. His view is that law is fundamentally a series
of rules by which a state governs society. Both of
these definitions are correct, today, in some respects
and wrong in others. To define law properly, both
theories must be judged together. The fallacy of the
one view is that it confounds law with ethics; the
fallacy of the other is that it confounds law with force.
As Pascal stated with respect to government, both
reason and force are essential for any proper concept
of law. Law without the power of government to
enforce it is not law but morals. Law without the
basis of morality and reason is not law but tyranny.
If a choice were to be made, it is evident that natural
law is probably the most important since right will
eventually make might, but might cannot make right.
Law must of a necessity arise out "of the nature of
things" and her true voice is the voice of reason. Still,
we cannot ignore the fact that it is the nature of our
society and our relationships within that society that
determines what shall and shall not be law.
We must recognize that these necessary relation":
ships form the basis of the law by which our society
lives, and that the rules of law are deduced by apply­
ing reason to these relationships. If we are to be gov­
erned by law and not be arbitrary will, we should
recognize these facts. We should understand natural
law and be able to interpret it. And through study
of the ideal system of natural law, we should acquire
the ability to perfect the rules of law enforced by
the state.
From this it is evident that not only is law essen­
tial for order in a community, but it is also a proper
expression and enforcement of natural law in a free
society, an essential for individual liberty. Only through
law can the rights of individuals be protected from
the power of government and only through law can
the citizens themselves exercise sovereign power. This
is the basic concept of our national constitution which
has become a model for free governments.
It is not a collection of "thou shalt, and, thou shalt
nots." Nor is the constitution a reference guide for
government action applicable only to the officers of
that government. It is law, basic law, embodying
the principle of exercise of sovereign power by the
people and their representatives. It embodies three
basic concepts. The first of these recognizes that the
individual has certain natural liberties and inalien­
able rights which the state has no power to regulate.
The second is that the people shall exercise sovereign
power in matters concerning themselves, that people
of states shall exercise sovereign power in state mat­
ters, and people of the nation in matters affecting
the country as a whole. The third is that no single
person, office, or agency shall exercise complete sov­
ereign power, but that it shall be divided into three
distinct branches, executive, legislative, and judicial.
Our constitution set forth in clear, unmistakable
language that government existed for men, not men
for government; that men, regardless of their eco­
nomic or political stature, were to enjoy these God­
given rights; and that neither their officers in the
various branches, nor their courts, could deny these
rights to the humblest of ctiizens. It implied that
law is order, and good law is good order. It estab­
lished rule by law rather than rule by individual. But,
I also believe the founders of our nation recognized
that many people are controlled by necessity rather
than by reason, and by fear of punishment rather
than by love of duty, a very practical outlook.
We recognize that it is through the judicial proc­
esses that the rights of the individual-these practical
rights as well as the legal rights which our system of
government emphasizes and guards-are made effec­
tive. Courts exist for that reason. It is to the courts
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that the individual goes to seek justice-not as a mat­
ter of privilege, but as a matter of inalienable right.
To us here today, these facts may seem a tedious
recitation of something we already know. We in
America take these rights for granted and assume
that such is the status now, was, and ever shall be.
Unfortunately, we cannot rely on this assumption. In
many countries today these illusions have been shat­
tered. Their citizens realized too late what was hap­
pening to them. In these countries there are no laws
.
as we know them, no courts and no juries. Rule is
by the individual, by the iron first, and millions of
people today are governed not by law but by force.
The average American is too pro:p.e to say, "but
it can't happen here." Too many are engrossed in their
own personal problems to worry about something
which they believe cannot affect them in any possible
manner. We need only reflect that in many countries
now ruled in this fashion, they too had rule of law. We
were not unique in that respect. But somehow, some­
way, this rule was superseded by the rule of individ­
uals.
As a result, millions of citizens have lost their rights
-the same rights that are guaranteed by our own con­
stitution. What law is left in these countries is a
mockery to justice. Courts are virtually non-existent
-as we know them-in many cases. The rights of cit­
izens are trampled and trangressions against public
and private institutions are the rule rather than the
exception.
The awareness, in the legal profession, of this threat
to the individual is to the credit of that profession. For
example, the active role of lawyers in one drive for an
international court of habeas corpus, is a manifestation
of the deep faith the legal profession has in the rights
and freedoms of the individual, regardless of his
citizenry, his position, weath or background. Such
concern for the individual, I know, exists beneath the
blanket of force which covers much of the earth today,
but, tragically, is being smothered, I fear.
With this evil force spreading across the face of
the Earth, ours becomes a struggle of survival. It is
no longer a matter of difference in international cus­
toms and heritage. It is now a struggle to preserve
our own orderly processes of law against the threat of
lawlessness. We are in the midst of that struggle now.
Nothing can be more evident to anyone who has
studied history. This has always been the first object
of any oppressor-destroy the court system-then re­
place that orderly system with his own individual rule.
It becomes obvious then, that the interests of the
legal profession are closely interwoven with the interests
of government itself. So it must certainly follow that an
alert, strong judicial system is a vital part of a vigorous,
alert government. Many of you here will take part in
that system and others of you, no doubt, will find other
careers in government work. With this in mind, I
would like to examine briefly with you some of the
problems we in government are facing.
First of all, we must recognize that there has been
a tremendous growth in government processes and
consequently the administrative law. It would be im­
possible to conduct this vast area of government with­
out.
For the first time in nearly fifty years we are now
legislating in a body which represents the people
fairly. A proportionate voice has been given to all
segments of population and area, and this fair repre­
sentation has been insured in future years through a
system of mandatory, periodic redistricting by popula­
tion.
In our administrative branch of state government,
we were able to make sweeping, much needed
changes during the 1957 legislative session. Particularly
in the area of fiscal control, we were able to bring
about a centralization of responsibility, and a stream­
lining of administrative function. This change is al­
ready yielding the state substantial savings in tax
money.
In our third branch of state government, the one in
which you are most interested, the judicial branch, we
are on the threshold of sorely needed changes. I am
certain that most of you are acquainted with the new
judicial article for amendment to the state constitution
which will be voted in a general referendum this fall.
Our present judicial article satisfied very well the
needs of the government and population when it was
established in 1840. But it is woefully inadequate for
our present-day government.
For a government based on the rule of law, the
present backlog of court cases is a shameful disgrace.
It is ridiculous when viewed against the intent of rule
by law as set up in our 1870 constitution-to give
speedy justice to all. No government based upon
mercy and justice can neglect these facts.
Plato speaking in his dialogues had this to say about
such a situation-and I quote-"Even when laws have
been written down, they ought not to remain always
unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is im­
possible that all things should be precisely set down
in writing; for rules must be universal, but actions are
concerned with particulars"-end of quote.
His words ring true today, just as they did when he
spoke them to his students in ancient Greece. Actions
are concerned with particulars. And the particulars
today are the legal delays that can be blamed on
crowded, badly organized courts. We realize that in
any field there is always some tendency to resist
change. We also recognize that any change made
merely for change's sake is senseless. But to resist a
change as sorely needed as the one in our judicial sys­
tem because of selfish or local interest is monumental
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backwardness.
Let me say here that the necessity for improving
this situation is an immediate, pressing problem. It is
not something that can be set aside for some future
indefinite solving. Citizens are being deprived of their
. access to justice-something that is their basic right.
It is a dangerous situation. People are quick to sense
danger when our legislatures or courts seem to lose
sight of their purposes. But this access to justice is an
element that has fewer automatic safeguards than
have our legislative and judicial systems. If we neglect
it, the dangers are multiplied manyfold.
I sincerely believe that we as citizens are being
denied one of our most precious assets-justice, speedy
justice. I believe that you here who are students of
At the reception for Governor Stratton preceding his Law Day
Lecture, left to right, Mrs. Lawrence A. Kimpton, Hon. William
G. Stratton, Governor of Illinois, Lawrence A. Kimpton, Chan­
cellor of the University, and Mrs. Stratton.
the law should keep in mind these basic ideals not
only in law school, but in their practical application.
It becomes important that you who are going to be
the future lawyers know these facts. If you cultivate
an active and intelligent interest in public affairs, you
will qualify as leaders of public opinion and even­
tually as our leaders in public office.
Interest and action with respect to all of these
matters are essential to the good lawyers, and, if you
pursue the law in the spirit of Justice Holmes, you
will achieve the desired results. Let me end by quot­
ing him:
"Law is a business to which my life is devoted, and
I should show less than devotion if I did not do what
in me lies to improve it, and when I perceive what
seems to me to be the ideal of its future, if I hesitated
to point it out and press toward it with all my heart."
The Board of Editors of the Student Lawyer, national publica­
tion of the American Law Student Association. Left to right:
Jay K. Longacre, Marion, Ind., AB., Wabash College; Allan
C. Engerman, Chicago, A.B., University of Illinois; Gloria
Martinez, E1 Paso, Texas, A.B., Texas Western College; Joe
A Sutherland, Editor-in-Chief, Fort Worth, Texas, AB., Texas
Christian University; and John D. Proffitt, Lebanon, Indiana,
AB., Wabash College.
The officers and directors of the Law Student Association, left
to right: John G. Satter, lr., of Iowa, AB., University of South
Dakota, President, James C. Hormel of Minnesota, Princeton
University, AB., Swarthmore College; John V. Gilhooly of
Rhode Island, St. John's Seminary; Ronald E. Tonidandel of
Connecticut, A.B., Amherst College; and Charles E. Hussey of
Maine, A.B., University of Maine.
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The Henry Simons Lectures
The Law School recently inaugurated a new bien­
nial lecture series, the Henry Simons Lectures. This
series has been established in recognition of the con­
tributions of Henry Calvert Simons (1899-1946) to
Political Economy, and as Professor of Economics in
the Law School from 1938 to 1946. Professor Simons'
essays are collected in Economic Policy for a Free
Society, University of Chicago Press, 1948. His major
work in the field of taxation is contained in two books
published by the University of Chicago Press: Per­
sonal Income Taxation, 1938; Federal Tax Reform,
1950.
The first Simons lecture was delivered in February
by George J. Stigler, Professor of Economics, Colum­
bia University. The lecture, entitled "The Goals of
Economic Policy" is to be found in this issue of the
Record. A reception and dinner honoring Professor
Stigler were held at the Quadrangle Club prior to the
lecture.
Nathan Blumberg, Professor Malcolm Sharp, and Dugald
McDougall, JD'37, at the reception for George Stigler.
Students, faculty and guests at dinner before the Stigler
Lecture.
THE HENRY SIMONS LECTURE
The Goals of Economic
Policy
By GEORGE J. STIGLER
Professor of Economics, Columbia University
I prize the privilege of delivering the first of a series
of lectures which will commemorate the work and
character of Henry Calvert Simons. My pleasure is not
in the least diminished by the conviction that he would
have protested at the suggestion of such a series of
lectures-perhaps likening them to the rigid, weathered
structures erected to military heroes, with the lectures
sometimes bearing a sufficient resemblance to the nerv­
ous, edible birds which hover about them.
And in one sense he would, of course, be wholly
right: the real tribute to a scholar is the continued life
of his intellectual work, and no amount of praise
periodically heaped upon dead ideas will warm them
to life. The work of Simons has received this tribute:
it continues to be in the center of a main current of
political economy which he did so much to create,
and today his thought is as relevant and as far-Sighted
as it was in the moment at which it was written. From
this viewpoint, the highest compliment one can pay a
scholar is to quarrel with him or to go beyond him,
and I am absolutely certain that Simons would second
my invitation to future lecturers to exercise the priv­
ilege more freely than I shall.
But in another sense, Simons would have had no
right to protest the establishment of these lectures for
they honor something that belongs to his friends as
much as to him: his character. This wondrously com­
plex man, of exalted integrity, brilliantly witty, ex­
quisite of taste, generous toward others and unreason­
ably demanding of himself-this man we are entitled
to honor, and without permission. I interpret my lec­
ture, not as a tribute-he deserves much better than he
will receive tonight-but as a reminder to the world
that we continue to love our friend.
I shall speak tonight on the proper goals of economic
policy.
Three goals have long dominated economic policy in
this country, and in the Western World. The first and
most ancient goal is the largest possible output of
goods and services. Maximum output has evolved,
under the impact of social events and economic anal­
ysis, into a two-pronged goal:
First, to employ as fully as possible-that is, as fully
as the other goals allow-the resources at the
society's disposal. Unnecessary unemployment of
men and capital should be eliminated.
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Second, to employ these resources as efficiently as
possible. Broadly speaking, no resource should
be used in one place if it would produce more
elsewhere-it should be impossible to reshuffle
resources to achieve more of some goods without
getting less of others.
The second goal is the growth of the economy.
Natural resources should be prospected, capital ac­
cumulated, and new products and technologies dis­
covered. These forward looking activities have for
their common end a steady rise overtime in the level
of income relative to population.
The last primary goal of economic policy is a com­
parative newcomer, still a vague sentiment when maxi­
mum output had been entrenched for centuries. It is
the reduction in income inequality. The goal of
equality, or at least of much reduced inequality, has
become one of the great forces of our times.
These three goals, maximum output, substantial
growth, and minimum inequality of income, have pro­
vided the justifications for every important innovation
in economic policy. Maximum output is the purpose
of our free trade within the United States, the com­
batting of monopoly, and various antidepression meas­
ures. The growth of income is intended to be served
by our various conservation measures, much of public
education, our public land policy, and the current
flirtation of the federal government with basic re­
search. Minimum inequality is the goal of the personal
income tax, agricultural policies, public housing sub­
sidies, unemployment insurance, and a host of other
policies. Of course I simplify when I identify a policy
with only one goal-it is a poor protagonist of an
economic policy who fails to argue that it will serve all
the goals of economic policy, and that it is also wholly
in keeping with the Scriptures.
There are, to be sure, a variety of minor goals of
policy. The desire to eliminate racial discrimination
has led to certain regulations of economic life, and
again, the desire for personal equality of treatment
independent of income has led to other regulations,
such as prohibitions on personal railway rate dis­
crimination. But these goals have had only minor and
sporadic effect upon economic policy.
One need hardly emphasize the obvious fact that
many of the policies we have adopted have ill-served
any of these goals. The farm program was adopted to
help a class of families with low average incomes and
possibly to conserve resources, but quite probably it
has increased income inequality, at least within agri­
culture, and it is extremely doubtful that any useful
conservation of resources has been achieved. The tariff
was presumably designed to increase domestic output,
but economists believe it has never been an effective
policy to this end. There have also been plain raids on
the federal treasury, such as the silver purchase pro-
gram, which have only the most tenuous connection
with the goals of policy. But every society makes mis­
takes in achieving its goals: often it misunderstands
the efficacy of a given policy in reaching a given
goal; and often the announced goals are merely cloaks
worn by particular groups seeking particular ends.
These aberrations and deceptions do not constitute a
contradiction of the primacy of the goals of maximum
output, substantial growth, and decreased income in­
equality.
A question that can be raised with respect to basic
goals is whether they are fully attainable. I would
say that they should not be. An abstract goal gives
direction to economic policy, just as the North Pole
gives direction to a compass, and just as the compass
becomes useless at the magnetic North Pole, so the
goals of policy lose their value as guides once they are
fulfilled. Specific goals, such as so many television sets
or highway miles or dollars of tax receipts, must
usually be realizable, but general goals should not be
fully realizable.
Whether one accepts this position or not, I think it
is fair to say that at the present time the basic goals
are widely believed to be tolerably well fulfilled in the
United States.
Consider income inequality. Few people think that
the progression in the personal income tax is seriously
insufficient and many think it is excessive. Public
sympathy for groups traditionally viewed as disad­
vantaged, in particular labor unions and farmers, is at
low ebb. It would be wrong to say that "under­
privileged classes" has been deleted from the lexicon
of neo-liberalism, but the concern for them has lost
urgency and to some degree has been supplanted by
concern for the peoples with highly developed desires
in underdeveloped economies.
The satisfaction with the productive performance
of the American economy is even more complete. We
feel rich. We believe that on average we are denied
only luxuries over whose absence no one can wax
indignant. It is true that the workingman still has
only a black and white TV set, and his car is several
years old, but so what? Who really cares whether a
farm program, or a river and harbor pork barrel, wastes
a billion dollars, or less than one day's output of the
American economy? Who believes that the rate of
growth of income is seriously inadequate, or that un­
employment of resources in recent years has been
grievously large? Even the critics of the Thirties have
been silenced or turned into flatterers. In as populous
a nation as ours there still exist critics of the productive
performance of the economic system, but they are in
the uncomfortable position of criticizing the form of
a golfer who wins all the tournaments.
This sense of prosperity, I am certain, is a temporary
thing. The postwar growth of consumer real income,
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compared with 1932-45, has been so sudden and so
large that we have not been able to build up new
desires, but they are gradually emerging. That cele­
brated axiom of economics, the insatiability of human
desires, has survived the much greater increases in
real income achieved at earlier times. In another dec­
ade or so we shall be complaining, and with sincere
pain, of the widespread need to satisfy elementary
decencies such as a summer cottage, the electronic
range, the wholly air-conditioned house, and the
family psychiatrist. But for the moment we are well
off.
Not only should the basic goals of economic policy
be unattainable-they should also be part and parcel
of the civilization of a society. Ours are not. Our basic
goals are the same as the basic goals of the Russians.
The Russians also believe in equality of income.
Their fundamental ethical claim, indeed, is that they
will remove all income differences not strictly justifi­
able by social performance and/or need, and in par­
ticular will not allot any part of income to a class of
private owners of the means of production. I would
quarrel violently with their belief that private property
is not a basic institution of economic progress, but
the argument is being settled for many people by the
substantial growth of output of the Russian economy.
'1\1e may also argue that the inequalities of income in
Russia are large, and not so closely related to social
performance as our own inequalities. Important as
these questions are in assessing the extent to which a
society achieves its goals, they seem to raise arguments
over policies rather than over goals.
And the Russians share the goals of maximum out­
put and rapid economic growth. Indeed every society
that is purposive and non-traditional seeks to do
efficiently whatever it seeks to do. The differences
among societies arise with respect to what output they
seek to maximize. In our society the output to be
maximized is chosen primarily by the individual con­
sumers; in the Russian economy the output to be
maximized is chosen primarily by a central, dictatorial
body. Hence, the Russian desired output contains
more munitions and heavy industrial equipment, as a
share of total output, than the American desired out­
put, but this again is a difference in content (of im­
mense importance, to be sure) rather than in goal.
Now, I do not wish to imply that a goal loses validity
because it is shared by an unfriendly person. It does
not seem sensible to abandon Mozart simply because
one encounters a boor who also admires his music.
And to spurn a goal such as maximum output is to
spurn rational behavior.
Nevertheless, the fact that our economic goals are
the same as the Russians' is anomalous: one would
expect two great powers to have carried into their
economic goals some elements of the political philos-
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ophies that lead to their antipathy and rivalry. The
fact that our goals and the Russian goals are the same
has also contributed mightily to the failure of Ameri­
can foreign policy-a policy which has no cutting edge
of political philosophy that might attract the leaders
of other countries. We offer the same goals, and differ
chiefly in promising less with respect to their ful­
fillment.
.The reason I wish to propose a somewhat different
set of goals than those we now profess, however, is not
to set ourselves apart from Russia, nor is it to capture
the intellectual leadership of the neutral world-al­
though these are not negligible hopes. Even if the
United States were the only body of land on earth
or in space, we should urgently need to give direction
and emphasis to our economic policies. It is high time
that we set aside the details of managing a comfort­
able dormitory and concern ourselves with the kind
of society we wish to inhabit.
The supreme goal of the Western World is the de­
velopment of the individual: the creation for the in­
dividual of a maximum area of personal freedom, and
with this a corresponding area of personal respon­
sibility. Our very concept of the humane society is
one in which individual man is permitted and incited
to make the utmost of himself. The self-reliant, re­
sponsible, creative citizen-the "cult of individualism"
for every man, if you will-is the very foundation of
democracy, of freedom of speech, of every institution
that recognizes the dignity of man. I view this goal
as an ultimate ethical value; others may wish to reach
it through powerful utilitarian arguments.
It is one thing for a value to have verbal sov­
ereignty; it is quite another for it to permeate the
social system. Individualism has few enemies in the
United States, but its many friends are becoming less
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fervent and its influence upon the course of events
is shrinking at an alarming rate. One would incur
ostracism in our universities if he denied that man
should be free to think what he wishes, but in­
creasingly he is looked upon as a quaint survivor of
ancient times if he believes that man should be master
of his fate, even when he bears the main effects
of his own decisions. The faith in the individual has
been much impaired by a fairly new doctrine, a very
old belief, and the changing structure of society.
The fairly new doctrine is that of environmental
determinism, which we owe to men as diverse as
Godwin and Marx. On an ever-widening scale it is
being argued that social institutions mold the char­
acter of man: that the food and housing, family,
neighborhood, and education of the child have a
decisive influence upon the way he thinks and behaves
as a man. Noone can doubt, in the light of generations
of social research, that this theory contains much truth.
Its thrust is evident: interest is inevitably shifted from
man's exertions to the social environment which to a
considerable degree determines the nature and direc­
tion of these exertions.
The very old belief is that most men are incapable
of conducting their affairs wisely. Only in the nine­
teenth century did this belief temporarily lose its
dominance: at the threshold of the period of universal
education it was widely believed that the vast majority
of the population could be educated to so high a level
of rationality that it could be trusted with the control
of public affairs as well as the proper conduct of per­
sonal affairs.
Now that the great majority of our population re­
ceives at least 12 years of formal education, it is no
longer possible to expect great results-one must ob­
serve them. And on the whole I sense a growing dis­
illusionment, although direct documentation of this
disillusionment is rather difficult to present because
the miracle of education still provides, for too many
intellectuals, the anchor of their democratic faith and
the emblem of their ethical respectability.
If I may judge by my own discipline, however, the
skepticism about the individual is reappearing in ex­
plicit form. The consumer, according to professional
economic literature, is a complaisant fellow, quick to
follow the self-serving mandates of Madison Avenue
or of a long distance call from a stock broker located
just beyond the reach of extradition. This consumer
is commonly given only the virtue of consistency, and
it is not clear whether his choices are treated as well­
ordered because his follies are reflexive, symmetrical,
and transitive, or because if they were not, his indif­
ference curves would intersect.
I suspect that other disciplines are becoming equally
outspoken, but we may document the declining faith
in the individual by something almost as strong as
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words-actions. Most intellectuals are in favor of in­
creasing governmental control over education (com­
pulsory attendance, certification of teachers, control of
curricula and school year, etc.) and of increasing
intervention by state and federal governments in local
governmental control of education. Yet education is
surely the one field in which, if education imparts
either wisdom or logical training, one would most con­
fidently expect that increasing authority be reserved to
the individual and the small political unit.
The last component of the declining faith in the in­
dividual has been the increasing complexity and
mutual dependence of socialrelationships in an urban
industrial society. The effects of an individual's be­
havior upon others become large. A farmer with
deplorable sanitary habits may be an affront to hu­
manity; a similar city dweller is an immediate hazard
to his neighbors. An eccentric or timid pioneer (if this
latter is not a contradiction in terms) bears the main
costs of his deficiencies; a similar entrepreneur can
throw a thousand blameless men out of work (not very
long, however). A man, in short, can be trusted with
hostile Indians, but not with friendly citizens.
I hope that I have sketched with some plausability
the causes of the decline of faith in the unregulated
and unguided individual, for each contains a good
deal of validity. Each has also been much exagger­
ated. No social research has shown that a man's be­
havior is independent of his will, or that in our society
his potentialities of achievement are rigidly set by
his environment. Our trust in education has been a
narrow, academic faith, and we have almost forgotten
that there are such things as non-academic abilities
or that the schoolroom is only one, and not the major,
center of education for life. And if our society is grow­
ing more complex, it is also offering a variety of
opportunities for individual choice quite beyond the
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dreams of earlier times.
One can nevertheless �oncede much validity to the
main sources of decline of faith in the individual,
and yet not budge one inch from the goal of indi­
vidual freedom. That men are not independent of
their environments does not mean that they should
be denied the opportunity of determining their lives,
and their environments, as far as this is possible. That
education does not turn most men into scholars does
not reduce the value of allowing them to make their
own wise and stupid decisions. That the increasing
interdependence of men calls for a continuing review
of their rights and duties is no reason for assuming
either that no opportunities for new freedom arise
or that conflicts can be settled only by coercion. We
shall wish to revise the particular content of individ­
ual freedom and responsibility as our society, and
as our understanding of our society, change, but
always there is the problem-the transcendental prob­
lem of all liberal societies-of seeking to enlarge the
individual's share in conducting his life. Men are not
mere social animals, to be governed into prosperity or
tranquilized into non-unhappiness.
-Let us return to our traditional goals of economic
policy. Two of them-maximum output and substan­
tial growth - are ethically neutral: they could be
adopted by a nation of gourmets or ascetics or war­
riors, by tyrants or by democrats. What ethical con­
tent they possess has been introduced, almost surrep­
titiously, by defining output as that which is desired
by free men.
We have placed the main burden of direction of
social policy upon the goal of reduced income inequal­
ity, and it cannot bear this burden. It represents,
indeed, quite fairly one element of the basic value
of individualism: humanitarianism, in the form of the
desire to eliminate poverty and its .concomitants such
as malnutrition and untended illness. Much as we
may quarrel among ourselves as to the proper way
in which to eliminate such ugly things, all of us wish
to be rid of them.
For the rest, minimum income inequality has a very
dubious congruence with our basic values. One would
fear for the individual in a society where a small
group of extremely wealthy individuals had the (mo­
nopoly) power to exploit others or the (financial)
power to subvert the political process. Neither threat
is real or potential: we have too many wealthy people
to collude, and too few to exert a directive influence
upon political life. The goal of minimum income
equality has at best an adventitious, and at worst a
perverse, relationship to individual freedom.
The goal of individual freedom does not lead auto­
matically to a cut and dried program of economic
policies. Continuing research will have to go into the
discovery of the meaning of freedom under changing
social conditions and continuing ingenuity of high
order will be required to contrive policies which will
increase this freedom. It would be much more at­
tractive if I could propose immediately a series of
policies which were wholly novel, irritatingly para­
doxical, and-after the smoke of battle had cleared­
irresistibly persuasive, but in good conscience I can­
not.
Precisely because the tradition of individual freedom
has been so fundamental to our political philosophy,
the most obvious corollaries of it are well known, and
these corollaries, like the goal itself, will appear out­
moded to many eyes. Yet the implications of the goal
are not simply a formalized description of life at some
admired date in history: we have never done as much
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or as well as we could, and today are doing very
poorly.
Consider the policy of competition. This policy has
a basic role in striking down limitations to individual
freedom and challenging individual capabilities, in
better proportioning rewards to efforts. Yet the policy
'is rapidly losing its popular support and its vitality.
On the one hand there is a growing faith-it is no
more than this-that the giant enterprise is the home
of progress; on the other hand, the argument that
monopoly reduces income has little emotional appeal
to a rich nation.
If we place a main value on the individual, how­
ever, there is no justification for our complacency.
Since the War our antitrust policy has drifted into a
spiritless action against the more blatant forms of
conspiracy and monopolization. While the federal
government has been opening up these backlots to
individual freedom, it has quietly been erecting bar­
riers to individual action throughout the prairies of
economic life, with its paternalistic small business
programs and the regulation of competitive industries
such as agriculture, motor trucking, and housing.
Our programs to assist distressed industries collide
directly with the policy of competition, and they seem
to me a clear instance of the abandonment of indi­
vidual freedom not because it is an obstacle to other
goals, but because freedom is not at the front of pol­
icy. Should we, as we almost always do, ease the
problems of these industries by restricting output,
stockpiling it, fixing prices-each a policy serving to
decrease the freedom and responsibility of the indi­
viduals who are in these industries or who wish to
enter them? We can achieve the same humanitarian
purpose by helping individuals to move to more re­
munerative industries and localities by providing
educational facilities, informational services, travel
grants, and other policies designed to widen their
range of alternatives.
When did we last initiate a large federal program
to increase the range of productive activities open to
the individual, or to enlarge the scope for individual
freedom within an area? Recent answers are hard
to come by. The question would be just as difficult
to answer if we addressed it to the heads of state and
local governments, even could we distract them for
a moment from such important work as the licensing
of scores of trades such as yacht salesmen, exacting
oaths from wrestlers that they are not subversive, but
mostly imploring a higher governmental level to take
over their functions.
We now have innumerable policies designed to
protect the consumer, including some that protect him
against low prices. Obviously we should help to pro­
tect him against those forms of fraud which he does
not actively seek out, but should we protect him
George Stigler, speakisig in Breasted Hall.
against unwise behavior? If we prohibit gambling
to preserve him from moral weakness or actuarial
myopia, should we not also supervise his investment
portfolio to keep his uranium holdings down to a pru­
dent level? My complaint against such policies is less
that the wisdom of a course of action is usually debat­
able than that there is nothing admirable about an
involuntary saint.
The policies designed to influence the distribution
of income call for thorough restudy in the light of
the goal of individual freedom. The main objection
to a progressive income taxation beyond that implicit
in the alleviation of poverty is that it imposes differ­
ential penalties on personal efforts that poorly serve
the goal of inciting each individual to do his best.
Almost the only instrumental defense for such a tax is
that large incomes are "unfair." The main possible
meaning of this charge is that large incomes are not
fully earned. When this is true, and the extent of its
truth has received embarrassingly little study, why
do we not deal directly with the institutions which
give rise to large, systematic, and persistent earnings
beyond what the community believes are just?
The inheritance of wealth may be one such insti­
tution. The right to unlimited, or at least very large,
bequest has customarily been defended in terms of
its effects upon the donor, with very little considera­
tion of the possible effects on the donees. It has tra­
ditionally been argued that the donor is led to vast
exertions and to continued thrift. Yet the need for
relatively free bequest to stimulate large efforts is
surely debatable: we find that men also make im­
mense exertions in areas such as politics, the arts, and
the sciences, where the chief legacy of a highly suc­
cessful man to his son is an inferiority complex. On
the other hand the large inheritance of wealth prob­
ably has the effect of reducing the incentives to the
heir to exercise his full capabilities-he has received
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the gold medal at the beginning of the race. Since
there are precious values in the family itself as an
institution, we cannot eliminate all gifts (let alone
intellectual gifts!) and bequests, but it may be advis­
able to tax inheritances (including gifts during life,
but not estates) much more severely than we already
do.
These comments on policies are highly tentative,
but I hope that they are sufficient to indicate that a
thorough-going philosophy of individual freedom and
responsibility would lead to programs that are neither
consistently "radical" nor consistently "conservative"
by our present standards. We do not have such a
thoroughgoing philosophy at present: we have been
content to defend the freedoms of the individual once
or twice a year, when the attack on them is unusually
direct and brutal, and complacently design our pol­
icies in complete neglect of this goal the remainder
of the year. No one has a greater responsibility than
the university community, which is among the chief
beneficiaries of a regime of freedom, for reviving
faith in this goal and for developing its implications
for economic, and in fact for all social policy.
Llewellyn Lecture
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extra income or an avocation or a sop to an idealism
"for which practice leaves no room," nor even one
expression of a richly-living man's desire to ride a two­
or four-horse team. But the price for these conjoint
advances came close to being as great as the gain.
Both the courses and the full-time teachers were con­
centrated on the rules and fields of law, "positive"
law, the rules largely as they stood at the moment,
indeed dominantly the rules "of substance." There
was some reason for this. The rules and fields of our
law were in chaos; they cried for organization. And
one can understand the initial neglect of the crafts if
the school was to provide, reliably, precisely what
apprenticeship did not so provide.
How Chicago Teaches Craftsmanship
Less justifiable and more unfortunate was Joseph
Story's inRuential curriculum at Harvard concentrating
on his straight "private" law, cutting out that whole
perspective and background of philosophy and of
national and international governmental practice
which had laid the foundation of such lawyers as
Hamilton, Kent, Calhoun, Webster and indeed Story's
self. Harvard itself is still laboring on the needed
recapture of what Story butchered out, but like every
first-rate school has long been at that job; the law
school at Chicago, the entry-port by which Adminis­
trative Law and Theory of Legislation came into the
American law school world, was founded with the
objective of such recapture.
It is also difficult to understand why, as the law
schools all over the country became parts of univer­
sities, they so long and persistently shut their eyes to
their duties of the exploration and inculcation of the
principles of craftsmenship. With the waning of
apprenticeship the arts of the legal crafts slipped into
the forgotten or into disrepute; either they were wholly
neglected or they were seen in terms not of deep truths
about man's nature and man's life with his fellowman,
but as matters of shallow and often ignoble artifice and
trickery. Yet the arts of law are not only essential to
any professional work, they are also law's common
ground with those humanities which are a university's
core and pride, and among which law should stand
with the proudest.
When the arts come to be slighted the answer does
not lie in shunting the responsibility, turning for ex­
ample as Columbia just proposed to an entrance test
in writing. The job is instead to develop in the student
rough carpentry and even skill in writing-in legal
writing, which as it ranges from statute and document
through to the brief and the negotiating letter runs the
gamut of all kinds of writing there are, outside of
formal verse. This is not hard to do, nor is it hard, as
one works in the instruction for accuracy and con­
ciseness and simple structure, to press also for life
and style. The brief, for example, and the statute,
provide teaching apparatus unmatched by the arts
college. But the job does take conscious thought, and
some effort.
Theory and Workshop Instruction Go Hand-in-Hand
That thought and that effort Chicago finds time for
on a scale not matched in this country, readily, if at
all. Hand in hand with it go theory and workshop
instruction in such basic crafts as advocacy and coun­
selling-each viewed whole and as a discipline, with
details of substance used as a good case-book uses
cases: to inform discussion and raise questions more
than to purvey information. The reference here is not
alone to the elementary composition which results for
every student from his first year tutorial research. It
is not alone to the counselling experience available in
the school-run legal aid work, but to the sustained
theory-and-practice of such a "course" as "Commercial
Law Practice," not alone to the general moot court
system and competition which is paralleled in many
schools, but to the developed theory which lays the
basis of the workshop "course," "Legal Argument."
Similarly, in the area of legislation, there is not alone
the universal introduction by way of second-year
tutorial work, but the basic theory that underlies each
of the three or more seminars in current legislation.
Three of Chicago curative procedures on the side of
perspective and vision call for particular mention. As
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with many another school, the work of the federal
government generally and of the Supreme Court of
the United States in particular come for heavy atten­
tion, from federal taxation and jurisdiction and the
due process and full faith and credit phases of con­
flict of laws on through admiralty, the federal aspects
of labor law and the rest.
But on the international side there is not only a
useful branching out from International Law as com­
monly conceived into specialized work in international
commercial and investment problems (courses, not
seminars), but there is a most interesting comparative
law development: a full year's intensive work in a
foreign legal system and its language is offered, fol­
lowed by a year's locally-supervised study and practice
in the relevant foreign country-a novel and ingenious
device for equipping an American to do legal work
across national and language barriers.
The second next matter on the side of vision and
perspective can be indicated very briefly: jurispru­
dence. There is not only an intensive course for
second or third year (weekly papers) on "Jurispru­
dence Law in Our Society"; there are in addition no
less than four further seminars in one or another im­
portant aspect of jurisprudence, given by five other
instructors from four or perhaps five other and further
points of view. One of the compulsory first year
courses has a full half of its five hours devoted openly
and happily to jurisprudence. But the most interesting
deliberate exposure to divergent points of view is the
third matter of mention. The general federal govern­
ment course, "Constitutional Law" is given by three
different instructors from three sharply divergent
angles, while at least three further approaches appear
prominently in other instruction. It is well nigh im­
possible for any student to get through the school
without heavy exposure to two or more of these
philosophies of government. The corridors resound.
There has, of course, been no thought in all of this
of so rebelling against the narrowness of the law
school's first great contribution as to allow the bene­
fits of that contribution to slide away. The full-time
law faculty at Chicago is large, distinguished and
devoted. And such work-taken by almost all students
-as that in estates, corporations and taxation provides
full and repeated exposure to what it is fair to call
the classical style of doctrinal architecture in a "field"
of law.
Case-Book Instruction Is a "Wasteful Road"
The same holds in regard to the second great ad­
vance in American legal education, the invention and
spread of the case-book. But not too many students
are fully aware of the price we have come to pay for
case-book teachings and, above all, of the ways in
which today's case-books have tended to defeat the
finest values open to the case-method. The price is of
course in first instance one of time-consumption: the
case-book is a horrifying wasteful road to information
about rules of law, while the modern editor who feels
that he must "cover" "the subject" is visited with
material as complex as that which faced the editor of
seventy years ago.
The case loses the life-contact and life-meaning
which are its essence when its facts are edited out.
Moreover the case has no instructive value on how
the judges do their work if its complexities are edited
out, and no training value for argument if counsel's
points are omitted. In addition the case loses its very
discussion value if it is presented alone and simply to
illustrate or communicate its rule, instead of appearing
with companion cases to show development or to
challenge to thoughtful distinction and synthesis and
in either aspect to clothe the general situation in ques­
tion with detail and flavor enough to turn student's
policy-judgment into more than a guess or a day­
dream.
Again Chicago both capitalizes the virtues of the
invention and cuts down price and waste. While case­
instruction dominates the first year and even the
second, it is case-instruction based on materials which
in instance after instance have been edited in the
finest original tradition: cases selected for discussion
value and for challenge; the cases presented in full;
if "collateral" discussion is excised, the bearing of its
content is indicated; companion cases presented in
quantity; and the like-with no hesitance at using text­
stuff for "coverage," if the class-hour is filled with in­
tensive discussion.
Moreover-and not alone in those federal-oriented
courses which properly center on the Supreme Court,
as in the very intensive series of cases on Competition
and Monopoly-a whole series of cases in a relatively
narrow area has been developed (sometimes from a
single jurisdiction) to enable real study of growth,
force exact analysis, and afford practice in argument
with the same materials which were available to each
successive bench.
Chicago Has Achieved A Healthy Balance
Finally there are the courses which vary the diet by
centering class-discussion on problems of counselling,
and those which use as the major material for use
statues fresh enough to force original solution of ques­
tions out of the study of their text, without advance
inquiries by any court. These last types of instruction
mean grateful change of pace in the instruction. They
also work in easily and quietly with the emphasis on
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counselling, some phrases of writing, and both theory
and practice of drafting.
The most recent of the major innovations in Ameri­
can law teaching has been the spread of materials,
interest and inquiry into the general societal and
government area of problems for government and law.
For forty years there has been drive and talk and hope
and experiment in this direction, with more effect on
teachers and on scholarly production than on curric­
ular architecture or the individual class-room. Chicago
has achieved as close an approach to healthy balance
here as the country has yet seen.
The pioneering explorations into behavioral science
for which the school has become famous have not in
the main touched the curriculum directly, though they
have offered students opportunity to earn money in
intellectually exciting work. But apart from the value
to any school of having the thinking of faculty mem­
bers profit by the ferment of frontier-research, one
finds interesting direct values for teaching emerging
from the studies of the processes of deciding, and one
finds the students alert, and pleased to be alert, to
the human richness of "law"-thinking which can draw
on (while dominating, not being dominated by) the
more usable results from neighboring disciplines.
The tradition of cross-fertilization is old at Chicago.
Its law faculty has contained a logician-philosopher,
long contained two economists, has in these recent
days of behavioral inquiry added men from SOciology
and psychology. Such men do not interefer with the
solidity of the school's training in the work of law.
They add-as each of the other aspects mentioned
adds-good measure of rich roundedness and balance.
They add-mostly by way of influence on their legal
colleagues-their part of that which makes the Law
School of the University of Chicago not only a pro­
fessional school of the first order, but a school of the
humanities: a place where vision and sound measure
live in concert.
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ments at Yale. He brings to his classes an enthusiasm
for the law and a sensitivity and sincere dedication to
the finer tradition of the lawyer's craft. His robust,
fresh approach to law, and to life, induces him to
develop new theories and ways of doing things which
he enjoys discussing with his classes and his col­
leagues. His is the talent, moreover, of impressing a
notion upon the minds of his students with a dramatic,
almost indelible quality. His unique choice of words
and illustrations and his coordination of vocal expres­
sion and gesture enable him to communicate with his
students with an intensity and vividness they do not
forget. One day after strongly emphasizing the dis-
advantages of paraphrasing a statute, he had his en­
tire class repeat several times in unison the phrase,
"Never paraphrase a statute." Someone in that class
may some day paraphrase a statute, but it is doubtful
�e will do �? without remembering that he should
Never ....
It has been suggested that Mr. Llewellyn is on
occasion given to overstatement. Whether or not that
is so, it is true that no one is more generous in prais­
ing a job well done than Karl Llewellyn. His great
admiration for men such as Scrutton and Cardozo is
well known and has been expressed by him many
times; these were men with horse sense who could
get to the barebones of a problem and come up with
a lovely, clean law-job that bites. Speaking of such
a man, Professor Llewellyn will sometimes strike the
desk with his fist, shake his head and, with a twinkle
in his eye, exclaim, "What a man it was!" On the
other hand, it is equally true that few are more devas­
tating in condemning a job considered to be poorly
done; Mr. Llewellyn hates a lousy, lazy job and has
no use for the man who did it, damn his soul, and
does not hesitate to tell him so.
Professor Llewellyn and his wife, Soia Mentschi­
koff, also on the faculty of the University of Chicago
Law School, reserve one evening a week for an 'at
home' with their students affording them an oppor­
tunity to know their students better. Mr. Llewellyn
is a widely read man, has many interests outside the
law and is happy to talk with students on various
topics whether or not related to law. This is typical
of the personal interest Professor Llewellyn has always
taken in his students. And many of the men who have
studied under him write from time to time telling
him of their plans and accomplishments.
A list of Mr. Llewellyn's interests outside of law
should include his activity as a boxer while a student
at Yale. His participation in sports today, however,
centers mainly around golf which he plays regularly.
The development and care of orchards is another
subject which holds an especial fascination for Mr.
Llewellyn, and is one in which he considers himself
somewhat expert. Cats, of course, have been a great
love of his for many years. He has owned several
Maltese cats which he has even used as the subjects
of some of his poems. For, in addition to the many
books, articles and lectures on law he has published,
Karl Llewellyn has found time to put together two
books of poetry, Beach Plums and Put In His Thumb.
His poems deal with a wide range of subjects which
have interested him; some even deal with certain
aspects of the law. But whatever the topic, they all
contain the vitality and depth which characterize all
of Professor Llewellyn's work, and which, in fact,
characterize Professor Llewellyn himself.
Jack D. Beem, JD '55
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versity of Michigan; and Alan Washburn, Rapid City, S.D., A.B., Shimer College. Third row: Eric Rosenfeld, Pittsfield, Mass., A.B.,
Harvard University; Richard Scupi, Chicago, AB., University of Chicago; Frank D. Mayer, Jr., Chicago, AB., Amherst Col­
lege; George Bobrinskoy, Chicago, A.B., Amherst College; Ronald Tonidandel, Stafford Springs, Conn., A.B., Amherst College
and Robert Lofts, Alton, Illinois, AB., University of Chicago. Back row: Merlin Baker, Provo, Utah, S.B., Brigham Young Uni­
versity, George Saunders, [r., Birmingham, Ala., University of Alabama, Robert Zener, (Editor-in-Chief), Pittsburgh, AB., Univer­
sity of Chicago, London School of Economics; [ohn Ritscher, Lotigmeadoui, Mass., AB., Bowdoin College, and Michael Douty,
Chicago, A.B., Swarthmore College.
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Theodore Roosevelt and
The First Law Cornerstone
(When the cornerstone of the current Law Building
was laid in April, 1903, the principal address was de­
livered by President Theodore Roosevelt. That speech
is reprinted below as it appe(lrs in the University
Record, Volume VII, May, 1902-April, 1903.)
Mr. President, men and women of the University,
and you, my fellow-citizens, people of the great city
of the West:
I am glad indeed to have the chance of being with
you this afternoon to receive this degree at the hands
of President Harper, and in what I have to say there is
little that I can do save to emphasize certain points
made in the address of Mr. Judson.
I speak to you of this University, to you who belong
to the institution, the creation of which has so nobly
rounded out the great career of mercantile enterprise
and prosperity which Chicago not merely embodies,
but of which in a peculiar sense the city stands as
symbolical.
It is of vast importance to our well-being as a nation
that there should be a foundation deep and broad of
material well-being. No nation can amount to anything
great unless the individuals composing it have so
worked with the head or with the hand for their
A composite photograph showing the site of the new Law
Buildings. The American Bar Center is on the left; a portion
of Burton-Judson Courts, in which law students are housed,
may be seen on the right. The photograph of a model of the
new Law Buildings, shown directly above the site they will
occupy, is reproduced in approximately the same scale.
own benefit as well as for the benefit of their fellows
in material ways, that the sum of the national pros­
perity is great. But that alone does not make true
greatness or anything approaching true greatness. It
is only the foundation for it, and it is the existence of
. institutions such as this, above all the existence of
institutions turning out citizens of the type which I
know you turn out, that stands as one of the really
great assets of which a nation can speak when it
claims true greatness.
From this institution you will send out scholars, and
it is a great and a fine thing to send out scholars to add
to the sum of productive scholarship. To do that is to
take your part in doing one of the great duties of
civilization, but you will do more than that, for greater
than the school is the man, and you will send forth
men; men who will scorn what is base and ignoble;
men of high ideals, who yet have the robust, good
sense necessary to allow for the achievement of the
high ideal by practical methods.
It was one of our American humorists who, like all
true humorists, was also a sage, who said that it was
easier to be a harmless dove than a wise serpent.
Now, the aim in production of citizenship must not be
merely the production of harmless citizenship. Of
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course, it is essential that you should not harm your
fellows, but if, after you are through with life, all that
can be truthfully said of you is that you did not do
any harm, it must also truthfully be added that you
did no particular good.
Remember that the commandment had the two
sides, to be harmless as doves and wise as serpents;
to be moral in the highest and broadest sense of the
word; to have the morality that abstains and endures,
and also the morality that does and fears, the morality
that can suffer and the morality that can achieve re­
sults-to have that and, coupled with it, to have the
en�rgy, the power to accomplish things which every
good citizen must have if his citizenship is to he of
real value to the community.
Mr. Judson said in his address today that the things
we need are elemental. We need to produce not
genius, not brilliancy, but the homely, commonplace,
elemental virtues. The reason we won. in 1776, the
reason that in great trial from 1861 to 1865 this nation
rang true metal, was because the average citizen had
in him the stuff out of which good citizenship has
been made from time immemorial, because he had in
him honesty, courage, common sense.
Brilliancy and genius? Yes, if we can have them in
addition to the other virtues. If not, if brilliant genius
comes without the accompaniment of the substantial
qualities of character and soul, then it is a menace to
the nation. If it comes in addition to those qualities,
then of course we get the great general leader, we get
the Lincoln, we get the man who can do more than
any common man can do. But without it much can be
done.
The men who carried musket and saber in the
armies of the East and West through the four grim
years which at last saw the sun of peace rise at Ap­
pomattox had only the ordinary qualities, but they
were pretty good ordinary qualities. They were the
qualities which, when possessed as those men pos­
sessed them, made in their sum what we call heroism.
And what those men had need to have in time of
war, we must have in time of peace, if we are to make
this nation what it should ultimately become, if we are
to make this nation in very fact the great republic, the
greatest power upon which the sun has ever shone.
And no one quality is enough. First of all is honesty
-remember that I am using the word in its broadest
signification-honesty, decency, clean living at home,
clean living abroad, fair dealing in one's own family,
fair dealing by the public.
And honesty is not enough. If a man is never so
honest, but is timid, there is nothing to be done with
him. In the Civil War you needed patriotism in the
Continued on page 34
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soldier, but if the soldier had the patriotism, and yet
felt compelled to run away when that was needed, he
was not of much use.
Together with honesty you must have the second
of the virile virtues, courage; courage to dare, courage
to withstand the wrong and to fight aggressively and
vigorously for the right.
And if you have only honesty and courage, you may
yet be an entirely worthless citizen. An honest and
valiant fool has but a small place of usefulness in the
body politic. With honesty, with courage, must go
common sense: ability to work with your fellows,
ability when you go out of the academic halls to work
with the men of this nation, the millions of men who
have not an academic training, who will accept your
leadership on just one consideration, and that is if you
show yourself in the rough work of actual life fit and
able to lead, and only so.
You need honesty, you need courage, and you need
common sense. Above all you need it in the work to
be done in the building the corner-stone of which we
laid today, the law school out of which is to come the
men who at the bar and on the bench make and
construe, and in construing, make the laws of this
country; the men who must teach by their actions to
all our people that this is in fact essentially a govern­
ment of orderly liberty under the law.
Men and women, you the graduates of this univer­
sity, you the undergraduates, upon you rests a heavy
burden of responsibility; much has been given to you;
much will be expected from you. A great work lies
before you. If you fail in it you discredit yourselves,
you discredit the whole cause of education. And you
can succeed and will succeed if you work in the spirit
of the words and the deeds of President Harper and
of those men whom I have known so well who are in
your faculty today.
I thank you for having given me the chance to speak
to you.
White-
Continued from page 1
change by addressing his new colleague as "Grand­
father Justice Brandeis."2
Another instance of White's playing the father role
is revealed in Holmes complaining to Laski, "The
C.J., who occasionally speaks to me as if I were un­
known to the world at large, said the people thought
I didn't work when I fired off decisions soon after
they were given to me."3
Umbreit wrote of Edward Douglass White that he
looked so much like a Chief Justice that he might
have merited the position on appearance alone." He
refers to him as a monumental man, who gave the
impression of massive strength. William Howard
Taft, who appointed him Chief Justice and later suc­
ceeded him in that office, said of White, "Massive,
dignified, impressive as was his physical mould, his
mental structure was like it. ... His capacity for work
was enormous."5 Indeed, while he was a member of
the Louisiana Supreme Court White wrote 80 opin­
ions in 14 months." During his 27 years on the Su­
preme Court of the United States he prepared more
than 700 opinions.P" His memory was prodigious. His
opinions, which were usually lengthy, he delivered
orally.
He showed a strong sense of judicial responsibility.
Taft, after pointing out that the study of cases with
a view to their decision in conference is a greater task
than the preparation of opinions, stated that no one
could have been more conscientious in this regard
than Chief Justice White." In the opinions themselves
White's sense of responsibility impelled him to dwell
continually on the "consequences" that might follow
a particular decision.
A suggestion of his general view in all cases is
is revealed in Holmes' complaining to Laski, "The
A. B. Dick Co. sold a mimeographing machine to
which was attached a plate which stated "This ma­
chine is sold . . . with the license restriction that it
may be used only with the stencil-paper, ink and other
supplies made by A. B. Dick Co." The purchaser of
the machine bought ink from another manufacturer,
and the A. B. Dick Co. sued this manufacturer alleg­
ing an infringement of its patent. A majority of the
court held with A. B. Dick Co. White's dissent fore­
shadowed the present majority view of the Supreme
Court. His argument in part follows:
"My reluctance to dissent is overcome in this
case: First, because the ruling now made has a
much wider scope than the mere interest of the
parties to this record, since, in my opinion, the
effect of that ruling is to destroy, in a very large
measure, the judicial authority of the States by
unwarrantedly extending the Federal judicial
power. Second, because the result just stated, by
the inevitable development of the principle an­
nounced, may not be confined to sporadic or
isolated cases, but will be as broad as society
itself, affecting a multitude of people and capable
of operation upon every conceivable subject of
human contract, interest or activity, however in­
tensely local and exclusively within state author­
ity they otherwise might be. Third, because the
gravity of the consequences which would ordi­
narily arise from such a result is greatly aggra­
vated by the ruling now made, since that ruling
not only vastly extends the Federal judicial power,
as above stated, but as to all the innumerable
subjects to which the ruling may be made to
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apply, makes it the duty of the courts of the
United States to test the rights and obligations
of the parties, not by the general law of the land,
in accord with the conformity act, but by the
provisions of the patent law, even although the
subjects considered may not be within the em­
brace of that law, thus disregarding the state law,
overthrowing, it may be, the settled public policy
of the State, and injuriously affecting a multitude
of persons....
"I cannot bring my mind to assent to the con­
clusion referred to, and shall state in the light
of reason and authority why I cannot do so. As
I have said, the ink was not covered by the pat­
ent; . . . This curious anomaly then results, that
which was not embraced by the patent, which
could not have been embraced therein and which
if mistakenly allowed and included in an express
claim would have been inefficacious, is now by
the effect of a contract held to be embraced by
the patent and covered by the patent law....
"
This paper will be concerned with White's contri­
bution to the development of American law, prin­
cipally in the antitrust field and in the field of admin­
istrative law. But, first, it will briefly sketch his
family background and his career before he reached
the Supreme Court.
He was of the fourth generation of Whites to be
prominent in the American scene and the third gener­
ation to serve as a judge. His great grandfather, James
White, was born in Ireland and came to America
as a young man. He became prominent as a merchant
in Philadelphia, and his name appears as a signer of
the Non-importation Agreement of 1765. That he
was of some scholarly bent is shown by his will, in
which he left his Latin books to his son, also named
James. The second James White, the Chief Justice's
grandfather, studied medicine. He moved to Fayette­
ville, North Carolina, and was elected a member of
the Continental Congress from North Carolina in
May of 1786, and soon after was appointed the first
U. S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Southern
Department. His interest in the efforts of the Con­
tinental Congress to draft the Constitution is shown
by a letter to Governor Richard Caswell of North
Carolina. After a short stay in North Carolina he
moved to Davidson County, Tennessee, and was
elected a delegate to the Territorial Assembly and by
the Assembly was elected a delegate to the Congress
of the United States from Tennessee. He was ad­
mitted to the bar in 1890. His son, Edward Douglass,
the father of the Chief Justice, was born in Nashville
in March 1794. In the same year, James White intro­
duced a bill in the Assembly of the Territory of Ten­
nessee to found· Grenville College. He moved to
Louisiana in 1799, at about the same time Daniel
Boone moved into Missouri. After the Louisiana Pur­
chase, in 1803, Jefferson appointed him a judge. He
served on the bench until his death six years later.
His son, the first Edward Douglass, became judge
of the City Court of New Orleans in 1825, at the
age of 31. He was elected to Congress in 1831 and
served three terms consecutively. One of his contem­
poraries in Congress was David Crockett. He voted
for the Compromise Tariff in 1833. That caused his
defeat, when he ran for his 4th term in Congress,
but in the next year he was elected Governor of
Louisiana on the Whig ticket. He served with dis­
tinction as Governor. Under Louisiana law the Gov­
ernor was not eligible for a second consecutive term.
However, he served two more terms in Congress
before he retired to his sugar plantation. There the
Chief Justice was born, on November 3, 1845. White's
mother was Catharine Sidney Ringgold, a daughter
of a pioneer Maryland family, whom the Chief Jus­
tice's father had met while serving in Congress. The
Chief Justice's uncle is the Ringgold immortalized in
the song, "Maryland my Maryland."9 White's father
died in 1847 at the age of 53. His mother married
again, to a man named Brousseau.
White was enrolled in the College Preparatory De­
partment of the Jesuit School in New Orleans at the
age of 6. Four years later, he attended Mount St.
Mary's in Emmitsburg, Maryland. After a year in
this school, he transferred to Georgetown College,
where he remained until the outbreak of the Civil
War in 1860. That ended his formal education at 15
years of age, except for a few months when he is
believed to have studied in the Jesuit College in New
Orleans during the following year.
At 16, White enlisted to fight for the Confederacy
as a private. He was promoted to the staff of Brig.
General Beale. He saw active service and was taken
prisoner at the Battle of Fort Hudson in 1863.
In 1865, at 20, he commenced the study of law in
the office of Edward Bermudez. Louisiana, of course,
retained the civil law as enacted in the Code Napoleon,
so all White's early training was in Civil Law. But
after White was admitted to practice, at age 23, he
applied himself to the study of the common law as well
as the civil law, so that he might represent clients with
litigation in the federal courts. In a short time, he
developed a successful practice in both the state and
federal courts.
He was also active in politics and took part in the
fight of the people of Louisiana against the carpetbag
government of the reconstruction era. He is reported
to have used a musket in an armed battle on the levee
to overthrow the Kellogg Government. He was elected
in 1874, at age 29, to the Louisiana Senate where he
served one term. Then Governor Nichols appointed
him an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
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Louisiana.
The theme of White's political life in Louisiana
was the bitter fight carried on by the Nichols forces
against the corrupt state lottery. In the end Nichols
and White triumphed and the lottery was abolished,
but the struggle had its ups and downs. At about
the time of White's appointment to the State Supreme
Court, the Nichols administration got the legislature
to revoke the charter of the 'lottery company.
After White began his service on the State Supreme
Court the anti Nichols-White forces succeeded in
amending the state constitution to write the lottery
into the state's fundamenal law and to set up a new
Supreme Court. The entire court was out. White
was always proud of his service on the State Court,
because during the short period of his service the
court caught up on its docket, which had been heavily
in arrears.
During the next decade White did not hold political
office. He devoted himself to the practice of law,
forming a partnership, first of Spencer & White and
later White, Parlange & Saunders. His practice was
successful. White was primarily a student. He spent
almost all his time, not taken up in court appearances,
in his office. It was said that there the light seldom
was extinguished until dawn. To pursue his research
in civil law he would consult the original sources in
Latin, Italian, Spanish and French. French, indeed,
was a second mother tongue to him, and the other
languages he spoke and read RuentIy. He lived in
the French Quarter of New Orleans until he moved
to Washington, and a great deal of his law practice
was from the French community. In fact, some
thought that the family name had originally been
Le Blanc. Even after his ascent to the Supreme Court
he continued his interest in languages and late in
life undertook the study of German. By his years of
practice in New Orleans, White earned universal
regard as a great lawyer with a profound knowledge
of both civil and common law.
During the same period, he was one of the moving
figures in founding Tulane University. In 1882, when
White was 37, Paul Tulane of Princeton, New Jersey,
placed a large endowment in the hands of trustees,
including White, to found a university. Believing
that the cause of education in Louisiana would be
strengthened if the proposed university were to be
combined with the State University, White devised
a plan, implemented by a constitutional amendment,
which allowed a transfer of the State University to
the Tulane trustees to found what is now known as
Tulane University. White remained associated with
the administration of the University until 1897.
White was active in Bar Association activities. He
became a member of the New Orleans Law Associ­
ation (the predecessor to the Louisiana State Bar
Association), on June 10, 1871, and after leaving the
State Supreme bench he took an active part in the
affairs of the Association. On November 20, 1880,
he was made a member of its committee on member­
ship. This position he retained until after his election
as United States Senator. This committee also passed
on complaints against lawyers of unprofessional con­
duct. On November 17, 1883, he moved the appoint­
ment of a committee (on which he served) to reor­
ganize the keeping of the records of the District
Court of Orleans Parish. The following year he was
a member of the committee to persuade the State
Legislature to transfer the law books in the State Li­
brary to the Law Association. White also served as
chairman of the State Board of Bar Examiners.
In 1888, then 43 years old, he returned to politics
and became campaign manager for Nichols in his
bid for another term as governor. The issue was the
notorious Louisiana lottery. Nichols won the election
and rewarded White by supporting him for the United
States Senate. He became Senator on December 7,
1891, and served until he was appointed by Grover
Cleveland, in March 1894, an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Shortly after his appointment to the Supreme Court,
White married Mrs. Leita Montgomery Kent, a widow
of a Washington lawyer, an old friend of his, and a
sister-in-law of the late Senator Gibson of Louisiana.
They had no children. The Whites became known
as an hospitable couple, famous for good food and
good conversation. He was on intimate terms with
senators and congressmen and other public figures.
After he joined the Supreme Court all other activ­
ities were subordinated to the work of the court. For
example, in spite of his continuing interest in George­
town University, he refused its offer of a chair in the
law school, although Harlan and others combined
teaching with service on the Supreme Court. He
resigned as vice president of the board of Tulane
University. He even refused to attend dinners of the
Gridiron Club, because of his care for the dignity of
the court. When President McKinley offered him
a place on the commission to negotiate peace between
Spain and the United States in 1898, he declined the
appointment.
His friendship with Theodore Roosevelt began in
1901. At that time Roosevelt sought his advice on
the question of beginning legal studies which would
occupy his time and fit him to be a better presiding
officer in the Senate. White advised him that attend­
ing a law school would be derogatory to the office
of Vice President. He proposed that Roosevelt read
law books from a list prepared by White and that
White would give him a quiz every Saturday after­
noon. The work was to have started in the Fall, but
the plan was abandoned when Mckinley's assassina-
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tion made Roosevelt President.
Roosevelt in a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, dis­
cussing Lurton's fitness for the Supreme Court, said,
"On every question that had come before the bench,
he has so far shown himself to be in much closer
touch with the policies in which you and I believe
than even White, because he has been right about
corporations where White has been wrong."lO White's
point of view on legal and economic questions was
much closer to President Taft's than to Roosevelt's.
In 1909 and in 1910, Taft consulted White about
appointments to vacancies on the court. As late as
the campaign of 1916, Taft sought information from
White concerning whether Hughes would accept the
Republican nomination for the presidency. White
assured Taft that he would."! Taft appointed White
Chief Justice in December of 1910. The appointment
was generally well received.
Before the appointment and after Fuller's death,
Holmes wrote to Pollock as follows: "As to the Chief
Justiceship I am rather at a loss. I should bet he will
appoint Hughes, who has given up a chance of being
Republican nominee for the Presidency, but I know
nothing. I think White, who is next in Seniority to
Harlan (too old, etc.) the ablest man likely to be
thought of. I don't know whether his being a Catholic
would interfere. I always have assumed absolutely
that I should not be regarded as possible-they don"
appoint side Judges, as a rule. It would be embar­
rassing to skip my Seniors, and I am too old. I think
I should be a better administrator than White, but
he would be more politic. Also the President's incli­
nation so far as I can judge seems to me towards a
type for which I have but a limited admiration. I
am afraid White has about as little chance as 1."12
Taft's brother, Horace, wrote to the President, De­
cember 15, 1910: "The appointment of White was
glorious . . . I see nothing but favorable comment."13
The confirmation of the new appointment by the
Senate came within 15 minutes of its reception.
At the time that White joined the Supreme Court
administrative law was almost non-existent. It would
be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this field
of law today. Because White's long service on the
bench (27 years) coincided with the need to spell
out the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in regulating the railroad industry and because of
White's interest and aptitude in this field, this branch
of the law owes more to White than to any other
judge. In fact, he might be called the Father of Ad­
ministrative Law in the "case and controversy" sense,
as Ernst Freund is the Father of the academic con­
sideration of administrative law.
The rise of government by administrative body was
inevitable. With the passing of the frontier and the
Prior to Mr. Fitzpatrick's lecture, shown above are, rear row,
members of the Executive Committee of the Committee for
the Edward Douglass White Lecture Hall, Walter J. Cum­
ings, [r., P. Newton Todhunter, JD'38, Thomas R. Mulroy,
JD'28, Chairman, Michael I. Igoe, Jr., JD'57, and W. McNeil
Kennedy. In the front row, Hon. William J. Campbell, Judge,
U. S. District Court, Honorary Chairman, Han. F. Ryan DuffY,
Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Honorary Chairman, Han. Michael I. Igoe, Judge, U. S. Dis­
trict Court, Honorary Chairman, and Hon. Julius Hoffman,
Judge, U. S. District Court.
growth in size and complexity of economic and social
life, it became evident that there would have to be
comparable development in the machinery of govern­
ment. The tasks were becoming too many to be car­
ried out by old agencies of government, separated
from each other in three branches, executive, legisla­
tive and judicial. A new system was evolving. A
particular area of governmental concern would be
set aside by Congress and entrusted to a new agency
which would have governmental power (partly legis­
lative, partly executive and partly judicial) in the
field assigned it. The prototype of this new form of
organization, the regulatory commission, was the
Interstate Commerce Commission created in 1887.
Immediately following the Civil War there was a
great period of railroad building. This railroad ex­
pansion was subsidized by grants of right of way,
loans, subsidies and outright gifts of millions of acres
. of public land. Additionally, state governments, coun­
ties and municipalities almost competed with one
another in generosity to the railroad builders. In the
panic of 1873, the people of the Middle West and
Far West began to realize that they were not receiv­
ing the advantages that they had expected from the
railroads. There were abuses: exorbitant freight and
passenger rates, watered stock, discriminatory rebates
to powerful shippers, and free passes to state legis­
lators and other people of influence. These evils were
aggravated by the attitude of certain of the railroad
magnates. Thus Leland Stanford said, speaking to a
gathering of railroad officials, "There is no foundation
in good reason for the attempts made by the general
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government and by the states to especially control
your affairs. It is a question of might and it is to your
interest to have it determined where the power re­
sides."14
The American people endured the abuses with
extraordinary patience, believing "That government
governs best which governs least." However, in the
midwestern states there was a growing reaction and
the Illinois Constitution of 187015 contained a clause
directing the legislature to pass laws to prevent unjust
discrimination and extortionate rates of freight and
passenger tariff on the different railroads in the state.
The legislature then passed laws prohibiting discrim­
ination and establishing a maximum rate, and created
a railway and warehouse commission to regulate rail­
roads, grain elevators and warehouses. This legisla­
tion was denounced as socialistic, but when it reached
the United States Supreme Court, in Munn v Illinois/6
in 1876, Chief Justice Waite upheld the Illinois Stat­
ute as an extension of the historical right of the state
to regulate businesses with a public interest, such as,
inn-keepers, common carriers and ferries.
On the same day that the court sustained the valid­
ity of the Illinois Statute, it handed down decisions
approving the right of a state to establish maximum
freight and passenger rates."? The period of public
regulation of railroads by state governments lasted
about ten years. Then the United States Supreme
Court nullified an Illinois law attacking the "long and
short haul" evil!", and three years later the court
declared rate regulation by a state legislative com­
mission invalid.l" These decisions put an end to state
regulation of railroads. Congress responded with the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It specifically pro­
hibited pooling, rebates, discrimination of any char­
acter and higher charges for a short haul than for a
long haul. It provided that all charges be "reasonable
and just" and it required the roads to post their tariffs.
To administer this law Congress established the first
permanent administrative board of the American
Government, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In 1906, the Hepburn Act authorized the Interstate
Commerce Commission to determine and prescribe
maximum rates.
Of course, ideas which are clear to us today were
not so at the time that White started to write his
famous opinions on the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion. It was White's contribution to the development
of law that he integrated the regulatory commis­
sion into our private and public common law, and
did it in such a way that it appears almost a child
of the common law. This was not an easy task be­
cause it involved the division of authority between
the national government and the states and the delin­
eation of the relationship of these new agencies to
the executive branch of the government, to Con-
gress and to the courts. Decisions by White and by
the court over which he presided established basic
principles, such as, that there had to be a definite
grant of governmental function to the commission by
Congress, that the commission had to follow proce­
dure consistent with due process of law, that when
the commission adopted a procedure, the parties had
a right to insist that it be followed-and perhaps most
important of all-that when the commission was given
a function of government to perform by Congress that
the courts would respect its role and not usurp it.
One of the important administrative law cases de­
cided by White was Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Abilene Cotton Oil CO.20 Justice Frankfurter explained
the significance of this decision: "In order to avoid
mischievous opportunities for the assertion of individ­
ual claims by shippers as against the common interest
of uniformity in construing railroad tariffs, this Court
so construed the Interstate Commerce Act in the
famous Abilene Cotton Oil case as to withdraw from
the shipper the historic common law right to sue in
the courts for charging unreasonable rates. It re­
quired resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission
because not to do so would result in the impairment
of the general purpose of that Act. It did so because
even though theoretically this Court could ultimately
review such adjudications imbedded in the various
judicial judgments-if a shipper could go to a court
in the first instance-there would be considerations
of fact which this Court could not possibly disentangle
so as to secure the necessary uniformity. The benef­
icent rule in the Abilene Cotton Oil case was evolved
by reading the Interstate Commerce Act not as though
it were a collection of abstract words, but by treating
it as an instrument of government growing out of
long experience with certain evils and addressed to
their correction. Chief Justice White's opinion in that
case was characterized by his successor, Chief Justice
Taft, as a 'conspicuous instance of his unusual and
remarkable power and facility in statesmanlike inter­
pretation of statute law'." Finally, Justice Frankfurter
epitomizes his evaluation of White's opinion as "A
creative act of adjudication unanimously accom­
plished.">'
Another of White's precedents in administrative law
is Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan.t? This
case involved the validity of a congressional act em­
powering a custom's official to impose penalties. The
statute was attacked on the ground that the imposition
and enforcement of penalties was primarily a judicial
function. White rejected the contention because it
magnified the judicial to the detriment of all other
departments of the government. The effect of this
case was to give greater scope to the action of admin­
istrative agencies, and, like Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison, to define the power of the
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In the case of East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commissioni" White
held that substantial findings of fact of the commission
made after hearings were not subject to review if they
had not been questioned in the lower court. In
another case he further developed the law with regard
to findings of fact made by an administrative body
to support its determination to the effect that if the
findings by the commission were not of sufficiently
substantial character to sustain the order then the
court did not have the duty to undertake an independ­
ent investigation of the facts in order to substantiate
the order."
Another decision of White was U. S. ex rel Kansas
City Southern Railway v. Interstate Commerce Com­
mission.26 An amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act empowered the Commission to evaluate property
owned bv a common carrier. The commission failed
to do thi� even at the request of the railway, claiming
that it was impossible to arrive at an evaluation. White
held that the Commission had erred in refusing to
exercise the authority granted to it, and that in so
doing, it was actually assuming authority it did not
possess.
A landmark decision of White in this field was U. S.
v. Sante Fe,27 wherein speaking of the commissioner
of the general land office and his subordinates, White
held that the function of government sought to be
exercised by the administrative body must be one
which comes under the role assigned to the body by
Congress.
White, in another case, stated the basis of judicial
review of administrative rulings as follows: 28
"Beyond controversy, in determining whether an
order of the commission shall be suspended or set
Continued on page 40
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aside, we must consider, a, all relevant questions of
constitutional power, or right; b, all pertinent ques­
tions as to whether the administrative order is within
the scope of the delegated authority under which it
purports to have been made; and, c, a proposition
which we state independently, although in its essence
it may be contained in the previous one, viz., whether,
even although the order be in form within the dele­
gated power, nevertheless it must be treated as not
embraced therein, because the exertion of authority
which is questioned has been manifested in such an
unreasonable manner as to cause it, in truth, to be
within the elementary rule that the substance, and
not the shadow, determines the validity of the exer­
cise of the power . . . Plain as it is that the powers
just stated are of the essence of judicial authority,
and which, therefore, may not be curtailed, and whose
discharge may not be by us in a proper case avoided,
it is equally plain that such perennial powers lend no
support whatever to the proposition that we may,
under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp
merely administrative functions by setting aside a
lawful administrative order upon our conception as
to whether the administrative power has been wisely
exercised."
Speaking of this case and of two others handed
down by White on the same day, Edward H. Mosely,
Secretary of the Commission, wrote to F. W. Car­
penter, then Taft's secretary, explaining, "I am sen�ing
three opinions of the Supreme Court of the Umted
States, speaking through Mr. Justice White, which
were rendered last Monday and which so strongly
h h f h C
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strengt en t e power 0 t e omrmssion.
In a letter to Laski, Holmes said ", . , I think the
credit is wholly his (White's) about making the re­
lations between the Interstate Commerce Commission
and our court clear and putting the whole important
business on a sound and workable footing."30
Chief Justice Taft in speaking of White's opinions
in this field said: "( They) are models of clear and
satisfactory reasoning which give to the people, to
state legislatures, to Congress, and the courts a much
needed knowledge of the practical functions the Com­
merce Commission was to discharge, and of how they
were to be reconciled to existing government ma­
chinery . . . They are conspicuous instances of his
unusual and remarkable power for facts and states­
manlike interpretation of statute law."31
Somewhat similar to the need to control and reg­
ulate the railroad industry was the need to control the
great combinations of wealth that grew up in America
toward the end of the 19th century. Laws to regulate
trusts and monopolies were motivated by the desire
to end corrupt and dishonest practices and by the
fear that the natural resources of the country were
being ruthlessly exhausted and that small businessmen
were being faced with ruin. In 1890, the Sherman
Act was passed by Congress. Every contract, com­
bination, in the form of trusts or otherwise, or con­
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations was declared to
be illegal, and every person who should monopolize
or attempt to monopolize any part of trade or com­
merce among the several states was made guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Taken literally the Sherman Act would have forbid­
den almost every contract or combination. White
would not accept such an indiscriminate application
of the law. In his famous dissent in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,32 166 U. S. 200, 351,
( 1897) he argued, "To define the words 'In restraint
of trade' as embracing every contract which in any
degree produced that effect would be violative of
reason because it would include all those contracts
which are the very essence of trade and would be
equivalent to saying that there should be no trade,
therefore, nothing to restrain." The dilemma which
would necessarily arise from defining the words (con­
tracts in restraint of trade) so as to destroy by render­
ing illegal the contracts upon which trade �epends,
and yet pre-supposing that trade would contmue and
should not be restrained, is shown by the argument
advanced, and which has been compelled by the
exigency of the premise upon which it is based."
The following year the Addyston Pipe case ap­
peared on appeal before the 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals." William Howard Taft wrote the opinion
for the court. In sustaining the government's conten­
tion, that the combine in question was illegal, Judge
Taft began by stating that the (majority) opinion in
the Trans-Missouri case would he a sufficient answer
to the defendants, since the majority opinion held
every restraint of trade to be forbidden by the Sher­
man Act. However, he then proceeded, by an analysis
of the authorities, to show that the practices of the
defendants could not be considered reasonable in the
common law sense. Five years later suit was brought
by the government to dissolve the holding company
set up by Hill, Morgan and Harriman, the Northern
Securities case.33a The majority held that there was
a violation of the Sherman Act. There were four
dissenters: White, Fuller, Peckham and Holmes, on
the ground that the Sherman Act did not apply to
contracts concerning the ownership of stock.
It was in the Standard Oil34 and American Tobacco
cases'" that White, then Chief Justice, speaking for
the court, with only Harlan dissenting, defined and
explained the rule of reason, distinguishing between
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those economic combinations that were harmful and
those that were useful in modern society.
Two criticisms have been made of the rule of
reason: first, that it was obiter dictum because the
Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Com­
pany were violative of the Sherman Anti-trust Act
under any interpretation. Therefore there was no need
of a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
restraints of trade. Secondly, that in basing the rule of
reason on common law principles White erred in that
the common law only made the distinction between
reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade in the
matter of contracts that were ancillary to a main con­
tract of sale and reasonably adapted and limited to
the contract's lawful purpose. The charge that the
"rule of reason" concept does not comport with the
common law is well answered by quotations from
Justice Stone and from Justice Holmes.
Justice, later Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, said:
"In seeking more effective protection of the public
from the growing evils of restraints on the competitive
system effected by the concentrated commercial power
of 'trusts' and 'combinations' at the close of the nine­
teenth century, the legislators found ready at their
hand the common law concept of illegal restraints of
trade or commerce. In enacting the Sherman law they
took over that concept by condemning such restraints
wherever they occur in or affect commerce between
the states. They extended the condemnation of the
statute to restraints effected by any combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, as well
as by contract or agreement, having those effects on
the competitive system and on purchasers and con­
sumers of goods or services which were characteristic
of restraints deemed illegal at common law, and they
gave both private and public remedies for the injuries
flowing from such restraints.
"That such is the scope and effect of the Sherman
Act was first judicially recognized and expounded in
the classic opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. (CCA 6th) 85 F 271, affirmed in 175
U. S. 211, written by Judge, later Chief Justice Taft,
and concurred in by Justice Harlan and Judge, later
Justice Lurton of this court. This court has since re­
peatedly recognized that the restraints at which the
Sherman law is aimed, and which are described by its
terms are only those which are comparable to re­
straints deemed illegal at common law, although ac­
complished by means other than contract and which,
for constitutional reasons, are confined to transactions
in or which affect interstate commerce.
"In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,
54,55, 58, decided in 1911, this court, speaking through
Chief Justice White, pointed out that the restraint of
trade contemplated by section 1 of the Act took its
origin from the common law, and that the Sherman
Act was adapted to the prevention, in modern con­
ditions, of conduct or dealing effecting the wrong, at
which the common law doctrine was aimed. This, it
was said, is 'the dread of enhancement of prices and
of other wrongs which it was thought would flow
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions
caused by contracts or other acts of individuals or
corporations ...
' The court declared, page 59, that
'the statute was drawn in the light of the existing
practical conception of the law of restraint of trade,'
and drew the conclusion that the restraints which were
condemned by the statute are those which, following
the common law analogy are 'unreasonable or undue:
This view was followed and more explicitly stated in
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.
106, 169, where it was said:
'
... it was held in the
Standard Oil Co. Case that as the words 'restraint of
trade' at common law and in the law of this country
at the time of the adoption of the Antitrust Act only
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combina­
tions which operated to the prejudice of the public
interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the due course of trade or which, either
because of their inherent nature or effect or because
of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously re­
strained trade, that the words as used in the statute
were designed to have and did have but a like signif­
icance.' In thus grounding the 'rule of reason' upon
the analogy of the common law doctrines applicable
to illegal restraints of trade the court gave a content
and meaning to the statute in harmony with its history
and plainly indicated by its legislative purpose."36
Justice Holmes said in one of his letters to Mr. Wu,
"In Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 377, a
man was indicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act for
a conspiracy in restraint of trade and to monopolize
trade. It was objected that as a criminal statute the
law was bad, because it had been construed to pro­
hibit only such contracts and combinations as unduly
restricted competition or unduly obstructed the
course of trade, and so construed it was too indefinite
for a criminal law. But in the opinion I pointed out,
p. 377, that 'the law is full of instances where a man's
fate depends on his estimating right, that is, as the
jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree,'
that an act might be murder, manslaughter or mis­
adventure according to the degree of danger attending
it according to common experience in the circum­
stances known to the actor. As I put it in a later case
. . . 'The conditions are as permanent as anything
human, and a great body of precedents on the civil
side coupled with familiar practice make it com­
paratively easy for common sense to keep to what is
f '''37sa e.
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That White's construction of the Sherman Act was
beneficial is generally conceded by his critics. Pro­
fessor Dishman in his article on "Mr. Justice White
and the Rule of Reason,"38 although rejecting the
common law historical basis of the rule of reason,
states: "This is not to say, as some critics have said,
that the rule has seriously hampered the Depart­
ment of Justice in enforcing the antitrust law. We
have it on the authority of Thurman Arnold that
without the rule the Sherman Act would have been
unworkable because every combination between two
men in business is in some measure a restraint of trade.
The rule, he has said, has the effect of preventing the
antitrust law from destroying the efficiency of those
combinations which are actually serving, instead of ex-
ploiting, the consumer."39
.
There is not space to discuss White's contribution to
other fields of law. However, someone is bound to
raise the question, where did White stand on the great
social issues of his day? Was he a liberal?-like Holmes?
It is impossible to squeeze the massive White into a
pigeonhole however labelled. There is always a de­
mand to put Supreme Court Judges into categories.
It eliminates the need to examine what they decided
or to read what they said-we know all about them
from the label.
First and foremost White was a lawyer. To him the
law was a discipline in the academic sense with its
own goals and methodology. When he decided cases
before him, he decided them according to legal stand­
ards, that is, the law he found in the constitution, the
statutes and the case precedents, with a permissible
leeway allowed judges, as it is expressed by Cardozo,
"as new problems arise, equity and justice will direct
the mind to solutions which will be found, when they
are scrutinized, to be consistent with symmetry and
order or even to be a starting point of a symmetry
and order theretofore unknown."39a That White had a
classical notion of "facts" as well as law is shown by
his remark to counsel during the oral arguments of
Stettler v. O'Hara,40 "Mr. Frankfurter, I could gather
twice as much material to show that private property
is wrong and should be abolished,"41 manifesting a re­
luctance to regard sociological data gathered upon a
hypothesis as the equivalent of evidence emerging
from direct and cross-examination.
His rule of reason in the antitrust cases and his per­
sistent interest in the new field of administrative law­
defined by Dean Pound as "that branch of modern law
under which the executive department of government
. . . interferes with the conduct of the individual for
the purpose of promoting the well-being of the com­
munity . . ,"42 is evidence that White had a feeling
for the unity of society.43 Freedom is seen by him as
not freedom from the obligations of association with
others but as freedom to associate. Judge Hershey of
the Illinois Supreme Court expressed the same idea
when he regarded the criminal law as if it was the ex­
pression of the minimal social duty exacted of the in­
dividual by the government. 44
White sensed that the danger to be avoided in
social reform was that it might destroy society by
fragmenting it. He knew society only existed by
reason of people combining together formally and in­
formally in countless ways. The search for a balance­
the compromise that would leave men free to associate
and yet guide their associating so that it would serve
the well-being of the community-may explain his dis­
sent in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case
where White said "the construction which reads the
rule of reason out of the statute embraces within its
inhibition every contract or combination by which
working men seek to peaceably better their condition."
It may explain his adherence to the majority in the
Coppage45 and Adair cases'? which struck down legis­
lation forbidding employers to discriminate against
a workman because he belonged to a union if his
action is judged wrong in these instances.
During White's time in the court, with White voting
with the majority, the following legislation was up­
held:
A state law limiting the hours of work in minesr'?
A state law limiting the hours of work for women.t"
The Illinois Child Labor law;49
State workmen's compensation laws; 50
A state law setting up safety regulations for coal
mines.P!
A state law requiring that script used to pay miners
be redeemed in cash;52
A state law requiring that coal be weighed before it
was screened in computing the wages of miners.:"
A state law forbidding contracts to limit the liability
of an employer for injuries sustained by his work­
men.v'
A state law prohibiting pool rooms.i"
A state law requiring that private employment
agencies be licensed?" was upheld but one abolishing
private employment agencies was overthrown."?
The Federal Employers Liability Act was upheld.r"
The Adamson Act limiting hours of railroad workers
and for the duration of a specific emergency fixing
their wages was upheld.!"
The state right to fix intra state rates was upheld.s"
The grandfather's test of eligibility for voting was
held bad;61
A city ordinance forbidding negroes to live in a
particular area if more than half the householders
were white was held invalid; 62
The power of a congressional committee to punish
for contempt was limited.'"
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However, an act of Congress forbidding the interstate
transportation of goods manufactured by child labor
was held unconstitutional.v' and White silently dis­
sented in the case upholding war time rent control
during World War I. 65
White's last judicial act was his dissent in the New­
berry Case.v" There White insisted, against the
majority, that the Federal Government did have
jurisdiction over primary contests.
In conclusion, I think to understand the greatness
of White, we have to see it apart from the subject
matter of his decisions. He is a great man because he
typifies the Judge in society. You recall the famous
controversy between Sir Edward Coke and James the
First. 67 James the First had given judgment in a case
that arose concerning the ownership of land. Coke, on
behalf of the court, set the King's judgment aside.
Then the King said that he thought the law was
founded upon reason and that he and others had
reason as well as judges, to which it was answered by
Coke, as he reports it, that no doubt His Majesty had
great endowments of nature but His Majesty was not
learned in the laws of his realm and cases are not to be
decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason
and judgment of law, which law is an act which re­
quires long study and experience. At another time,
Coke remarked that the law was "an artificial perfec­
tion of reason gotten by long study, observation and
experience and not of every man's natural reason; for
nemo nascitur artifex."68 This might be translated
"N0 one is a born Judge."
White is the type of the professional judge. This is
shown by his expertness in procedure. In a sense
procedure is the beginning of competence in the art
of being a lawyer or a judge, because procedural law
is the means by which litigants obtain the benefits of
other laws. When White went on the Supreme Court
a great number of cases involving questions of pro­
cedure were turned over to him. The same thing is
true of his service on the state court. This is unusual.
Ordinarily, questions of procedure and jurisdiction are
decided by the chief justice of an appellate court or
are assigned by him to one of the senior associates.
It is one of the noteworthy things of White's judicial
service that 54 of the 80 cases decided by him on the
Louisiana Supreme Court were concerned with pro­
cedure, and about one-third of all the cases decided
by White in the United States Supreme Court were
concerned with procedural questions.v?
From the lawyer's standpoint procedure is the ad­
venture of the law, and from a judge's standpoint,
procedure pertains to the due process according to
which he decides controversies. In the field of ad­
ministrative law, for example, reviewing courts insist
that administrative agencies act consistently with
their own procedures. To' a degree, the acceptance of
the belief that procedure is of little importance is a
yielding on the ideal of government by law and not by
personalities.
James the First was not the last legal primitive. The
simplicist notion of law is the cause of a great deal of
misunderstanding, and of unfair criticism of the courts.
When Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth was a young man
in New England it was expressed as follows: The
common law was only "adapted to a people grown
old in the habits of vice" while the law which the
courts of Connecticut administered "was derived from
the law of nature and of revelation.Y? The voice of
this tradition is sometimes heard today in criticisms of
decisions of the Supreme Court.
The law is the dividing of the big truths which, to
quote Arthur Miller, "define humanity and the right
way to live, so that the world is a home and not a
battlefield, or a fog in which disembodied spirits pass
each other without recognition"71 into the little truths
by which everyday life may be regulated. What the
law is trying to do in the field of action is a little like
Morris Cohen's search for concepts with a smaller
twilight zone in the field of reasoning." This is not
done in any free hand style. White's opinions, like the
judgments and opinions of other competent judges, are
a painstaking practice of an ancient art according to
its own tested methods.
White's opinions are also an answer to the sophis­
ticates, who would require such certainty of legal
definition that the law would be straight jacketed and
alike unable to serve the community, or do justice
between individuals.
By honoring White our faith and pride in our tradi­
tion of justice by means of the law is renewed. We
may hold our heads a little higher because Edward
Douglass White lived.
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R. H. Maudsley
Visiting Professor
The School is pleased to announce the appointment
of Mr. R. H. Maudsley, of Brasenose College, Oxford,
as a Visiting Professor in 1959.
Mr. Maudsley, after first class honors at Birming­
ham University, and six years of war service received
the B.C.L. with first class honors at Oxford University.
He was then appointed a Fellow of Brasenose Col­
lege, and/ has held that position continually to date.
He will be at the Law School from February, 1959,
until the end of the Summer Quarter of that year.
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union and non-union, in the unit. (This duty, inci­
dentally, is not easy to enforce in the absence of
blatant forms of discrimination such as that based on
race. )
Although the statutory scheme involves a limitation
on the freedom of a dissenting minority, this limita­
tion seems justifiable on two grounds: First, it is nec­
essary for orderly collective bargaining, which has
important values. Secondly, the requirement that the
bargaining agent have the support of the uncoerced
majority makes his authority consistent with the gen­
erally accepted principle that the government of
political or private groups should depend on the con­
sent by a majority of those governed.
There are those who would repudiate the require­
ment of majority support on the ground that a union,
at least if it represents a substantial segment of an
industry, is automatically entitled to the worker's alle­
giance and support. I find this argument unacceptable
for several reasons: First it ignores the fact that the
value of collective bargaining both to the enterprise
and to the employees depends on consent, by the
employees affected, to the bargaining agent's role
and to the agreement he has negotiated. Majority
support, although it is not sufficient, is generally nec­
essary, for such consent. For the purpose of deter­
mining the existence of such support, the "industry"
is an abstraction far removed from the employee's
interest, which is generally centered in the plant or
the enterprise which employs him. Accordingly, the
plant or the enterprise and not the industry appears
in general to be the largest unit which can be appro­
priately used in determining whether the necessary
majority support exists. Secondly, the use of the
smallest possible unit, consistent with orderly and
stable collective bargaining, will minimize the need
for subordinating the preferences of large and con­
centrated minorities to the requirements of majority
rule. Minimizing the coercion of such minorities is
still an important value in our society, despite the
expansion of institutional arrangements which pro­
mote the subordination of the interests of individuals
and minorities to those of larger groups .. For these
reasons, I believe that the architects of the federal
policy were wise in rejecting the notion that unions,
like the state, are entitled to any automatic allegiance.
When we move from the statute to the real world,
we are confronted with familiar and controversial
union organizing techniques which appear inconsist­
ent with the basic philosophy of both the Wagner Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act. I refer, of course, to recog­
nition picketing and to its close relative, if not its
transparently disguised twin, organizational picketing.
An appraisal of such picketing requires a judgment
about the underlying purpose or. purposes involved.
This judgment is, in turn, complicated because such
purposes may vary with the individual situation.
Nevertheless, the following generalized and familiar
description seems reasonably valid:
Picketing is an attempt to isolate the employer from
his suppliers, his customers, and his employees. Al­
though it involves communication, its primary signifi­
cance is not as argument appealing to reason but as
an instrument of economic pressure. The severity of
that pressure will vary from case to case. It will de­
pend on the allies of the picketing union, the sympa­
thies of the employer's employees, the sentiments and
fears of his customers; the location of his premises,
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and a host of other factors. But one aspect of picket­
ing is relatively constant; it is designed to exert the
maximum economic pressure on the employer and,
directly or indirectly, on his employees.
Where a union which lacks majority support pickets
for immediate recognition, and the Taft-Hartley Act
or similar state legislation is applicable, it is almost
certain that the picketing is designed (1) to cause
the employer to violate the statute by recognizing the
union despite its lack of majority support; (2) to
force the employer to coerce the neutral or anti-union
employees to join the union, again in violation of the
statute; and (3) to force the employees to join to
avoid the obvious danger to their jobs or earnings
resulting from the losses suffered by the enterprise.
The picketing may, as we will see later, also have
other objectives, but such objectives supplement,
rather than supersede, those just described.
When the union placard reads "join us" and the
union urges that it is only organizing and that it
doesn't want recognition until its has "persuaded" a
majority of the employees, is the situation any differ­
ent? Since organizational picketing inflicts the same
kind of economic damage as recognition picketing,
the pressure on the employer to disregard, or to coerce
his employees' preferences, is the same, and the pres­
sure on his employees to surrender their preferences
for their jobs, is also the same. There may, of course,
be skepticism about the union's disclaimer of any
interest in immediate recognition in view of the trou­
ble, the expense, and the commitment of union pres­
tige which is involved in maintaining a picket line.
Even if the union's disclaimer is accepted at face
value, two disturbing considerations remain: First,
the coercive aspects of such picketing necessarily in­
volve a threat to the employees' free choice; secondly,
alternative and non-coercive organizational devices
exist and are protected by the federal statute although
there is naturally controversy as to both the content
and the administration of the statute. Under the fore­
going circumstances, does the union's future interest
in recognition justify the threat to free choice and the
economic loss which organizational picketing pres­
ently entails?
There are four principal arguments in support of
such picketing, arguments which I do not find per­
suasive, either singly or in combination, where union­
organization enjoys the protection of the Taft-Hartley
Act or similar protection under state statutes.
( 1) The first argument, that peaceful organizational
picketing has the constitutional protection of free
speech, has been outmoded by a sensible shift in doc­
trine by the Supreme Court. The Vogt case, decided
last term, held that where there is a reasonable basis
for concluding that picketing was designed to coerce
the employer into interfering with free choice by the
employees, a state injunction against such picketing
is consistent with the protection of free speech em­
bodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Vogt case
thus appears to dispose of the question undecided in
the Gazzani case, namely, whether, for free speech
purposes, organizational picketing should receive
more protection than recognition picketing.
( 2 ) The second argument is that non-union em­
ployees, if they get less than unionized employees, are
undermining union standards, and if they get as much
or more, benefit from union activities but are free riders.
I find that both aspects of this argument unpersuasive.
If the employees get less, they ought to be ripe for
non-coercive organization. If they get as much or
more, it does not follow that they are free-riders.
The forces which govern wage determination are too
complex to warrant that easy assumption. In many
situations, a forceful argument can be made that
organization has not raised wages in the organized,
let alone, the unorganized area. But whatever the
truth here, the acceptance of so expansive a free-rider
concept would flatly repudiate the desirable principle
that uncoerced majority support in an appropriate
unit is a condition of recognition.
The third argument has been recently advanced by
Professor Cox of the Harvard Law School. In essence
it is that the primary significance of picketing is not
as economic coercion but as a demonstration of union
power which offsets the unorganized employees fear
of running counter to his employer's wishes. Accord­
ingly, Professor Cox concludes, a vote after picketing
may be a more reliable poll than a vote without com­
peting pressures. Professor Cox suggests, however,
that a union which has lost a Board-conducted elec­
tion should not be privileged to continue organiza­
tional picketing.
I find this reasoning subject to three principal diffi­
culties. First, an employer, who is being squeezed
by picketing, may not defer recognition until an elec­
tion. His early surrender may, for practical purposes,
foreclose any test by the ballot rather than make such
test more reliable. Secondly, the pressure on em­
ployees which organizational (or recognition) picket­
ing necessarily involves cannot, in the nature of
things, be nicely adjusted so as just to offset the em­
ployees' fear of their employer. Picketing pressure
may in fact be so strong as to destroy employee free
choice. In any event, pressure on employees as a
means of protecting their free choice seems anoma­
lous to me. It's like saying that a fellow applying for
a job as your bodyguard is privileged to show his
muscle by cracking you on the jaw.
Secondly, the picture of the cowed and fearful
employee may be overdrawn for many industries and
for many regions in the United States, now that the
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picketing is more persuasive. Coercive self-help to
rectify the inherent limitations of the law is a doubtful
and dangerous expedient. The acceptance of such
limitations, until the law is changed, is plainly one of
the conditions of an orderly society.
The acceptance of such imperfections is, I believe,
also necessary for orderly and stable collective bar­
gaining. The adjustments required when a plant is
first organized are especially difficult for all concerned.
The difficulties are increased when the union lacks
majority support as it often will if an employer grants
recognition merely because he wants to be rid of pick­
eting, "organizational" or recognition. In opposing
the closed shop, Samuel Compel's and Louis Brandeis
among other friends of the union movement, warned
that a healthy labor movement and stable relation­
ships within a plant could be jeopardized by union
compulsion. These warnings are, I believe, relevant
here.
The recent disclosures by the McClellan Committee
point to additional dangers. Coercive picketing, actual
or threatened, has been the weapon of the shake-down
artist, who will forego organization for the right price.
Such tactics, unfortunately but inevitably, endanger
the good name and the legally recognized privileges
of decent as well as corrupt union leadership. Organ­
ization from the top by the employer also invites the
sweetheart contract by which unscrupulous employers
and so-called union leaders sell the men out under
soft contracts which, however, often include the union­
shop and check-off provisions.
Although Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes
it illegal for employers to make, and union officials
to receive, certain payments, that Section is probably
not applicable to pay-offs designed to forestall organ­
ization. The sweetheart contract made with a union
lacking majority support may be nullified by the
Board. But in the absence of a rival union, recourse
to the law is discouraged by the union-employer solid
front. In any event, these perversions of picketing and
collective bargaining will be facilitated so long as em­
ployers are subject to the threat of organizational or
recognition picketing and the law and unions sanction
its use.
What 1 have said so far suggests that recognition
picketing is incompatible with the basic and desirable
principle of free choice embodied in our national labor
policy and should not be lawful. It suggests also that
organizational picketing, although somewhat more
defensible, involves substantially similar difficulties.
Furthermore, any difference between the two forms
of picketing is essentially verbal and is too tenuous
a basis for different legal treatment. Accordingly, my
suggestion is that both forms of picketing by a union
which lacks majority support and which enjoys the
Continued on page 50
statutory protections, including secret elections, are
over 20 years old and are,' presumably, increasingly
familiar. Indeed, if we accept the full implications of
the image of the fearful employee, it is not easy to see
why the picketing should end with an election which
the union loses. It could be argued that a reliable
poll may require continuous picketing until next elec­
tion, to offset employees' fears of their employer,
which presumably have been increased by the union
weakness reflected in a losing election.
The third and most important difficulty with Pro­
fessor Cox's position involves his unspoken appraisal
of the four sets of competing interests involved. First,
there is the interest in organization on the part of
those employees who remain fearful despite compre­
hensive statutory protections, including a secret bal­
lot. Secondly, there is the interest of the unionized
sector in expanding its influence, an interest which,
however, is not entitled to much weight under a stat­
ute stressing uncoerced majority support in an appro­
priate unit. Thirdly, there is the opposing interest
of those employees who are not afraid to exercise their
statutory rights. Finally, there is the interest of the
lawful employer. Professor Cox assumes, without tell­
ing us why, that the interest of the fearful employees
and of the union in organization should prevail over
the two other competing interests. I find this value
judgment highly dubious.
The final argument for organizational-recognition
picketing is related to the argument advanced by Pro­
fessor Cox. It emphasizes that many employers do
not obey the law, and that, they are often able to
nullify employee free choice by unfair labor practices
which cannot be proved or which even if proved and
ultimately remedied by the Board nevertheless suc­
ceed in frustrating legitimate organizational attempts.
It is, I believe, fair to assume that most unorgan­
ized employers want to stay that way. Furthermore,
the inherent limitations of the law, as well as bad ad
ministration, permit some employers, by unlawful
coercion, to deny to unions the bargaining status
which they would have otherwise achieved. But these
considerations, troublesome as they are, do not war­
rant the indiscriminate use of coercive picketing
against lawful as well as lawless employers and their
employees. The law attempts to surround non-coer­
cive organizational efforts with comprehensive pro­
tection. Although the law in this area, as in other
important areas, is necessarily imperfect, such imper­
fections do not justify coercive self-help. We would
give short shrift to an employer who sought to justify
reprisals against innocent employees on the ground
that some employees acting for a union had used tac­
tics which were coercive but which could not be
proved to be so. It is not clear to me why an essen­
tially similar argument invoked to support coercive
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basic protections granted by the Taft-Hartley Act
should be unlawful.
The basic analysis which I have submitted was ac­
cepted, in part, by the NLRB in the recent Curtis
Brothers decision. In that case the Board, rejecting
earlier precedents, held that "recognition picketing"
by a union immediately after it had lost an election
was a violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. I lack the
time for an extended analysis of the decision but you
may be interested in the following high points: (1)
Four members of the five man Board looked beyond
the union placards to determine whether the picketing
involved was to be treated as recognition picketing.
(2) Three members of the Board indicated that the
decision would be extended to minority picketing for
recognition and, indeed, to any other technique, such
as unfair lists or the instigation of consumer's boy­
cotts, which interferes with the employees' free
choice, regardless of whether an election had taken
place. These three, however, reserved judgment on
organizational picketing. (3) A concurring member
(Jenkins) declared that the decision was confined
to the situation where recognition picketing continued
after the union had lost an election. ( 4) Member
Murdock, dissenting, urged that neither recognition
nor organizational picketing before or after an elec­
tion should be declared unlawful but went on to say
that recognition and organizational picketing are in­
distinguishable.
Before the Curtis decision, Secretary Mitchell had
indicated that he would recommend federal legisla­
tion prohibiting recognition picketing but not organ­
izational picketing. If the Board pushes the Curtis
reasoning to its logical conclusion and proscribes or­
ganizational picketing the Secretary may be some­
what embarrassed. He may be forced either to
abandon his essentially verbal distinction or to press
for legislation which would enlarge, rather than nar­
row, legally permissible picketing.
On the state level, the problem is dominated for
the present by the interplay of the Supreme Court's
pre-emption doctrine and the NLRB's refusal, for
budgetary and other reasons, fully to exercise its stat­
utory jurisdiction. Under the Court's doctrine, the
states, by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, may not
enjoin peaceful picketing or other non-violent union
techniques directed at an enterprise which is subject
to the Board's statutory jurisdiction, i. e. an enterprise.
which «affects" interstate commerce. But the Board
will not take jurisdiction over all such enterprises; it
will in general exercise its jurisdiction only where the
enterprise meets certain tests of size, which are rough
measures of a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. Nevertheless, the existence of statutory juris­
diction by the Board, even though it is not exercised,
precludes the states from restraining peaceful picket­
ing. The net result is one which makes a lawyer
speaking to laymen somewhat uncomfortable. Peace­
ful picketirig, which falls within the Board's theo­
retical but unexercised jurisdiction can not be directly
restrained even though state and federal law each
separately recognizes that injunctive relief would be
appropriate.
Plainly, this no-man's land requires action, which
could take one of two forms: (1) The Board could
expand the area in which it actually exercised its
statutory jurisdiction. Chairman Leedom has indi­
cated that the Board will take such action, the result­
ing increase in the General Counsel's and the Board's
work-load would presumably require increased ap­
propriations by Congress. (2) Congress by legisla­
tion could modify the preemption doctrine so as to
revive state authority, at least in the area where the
national Board refuses to act.
Pending such a modification of the preemption
doctrine state law can furnish injunctive relief against
peaceful picketing only to an ill-defined and narrow
category of businesses, those which do not "affect"
interstate commerce.
I do not mean to imply that the narrow scope fer
state action is an argument against state legislation.
Quite to the contrary; the small enterprises which
may be found by the courts not to "affect commerce,"
and their employees are particularly vulnerable to
picketing pressures and are particularly in need of
legislative protection.
On the other hand, smaller employers probably find
it easier to get away with discriminatory reprisals
against employees for union activity. The principal
deficiency, and in my view, the decisive deficiency,
of H. B. 702, which was defeated in the last session
of the Illinois Assembly, was its failure to provide
for protection against such discrimination. H. B. 702
prohibited minority picketing whether for recognition
or organization. It provided for elections, although it
failed to lay down criteria to govern unit determina­
tion. It failed also to indicate whether such determi­
nations were to be judicially reviewable. But its fun­
damental defect was its failure to provide any
protection against discharges of pro-union employees
or against other employer conduct which is at least
as destructive of employee free choice as the picket­
ing which the Bill would have outlawed. Such pro­
tection seems to me to be a necessary. part of any anti­
picketing legislation. I recognize that this would
mean that Illinois would have to face all of the tough
problems involved in writing a comprehensive labor
act and the expense of administering such legislation.
I believe, however, that such legislation, which could
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draw on the experience of other states, such as Wis-
J
consin and New York, would be desirable. During
the discussion period, I will be glad to explore meth­
ods for achieving the maximum possible agreement
between labor and management on the content of
such an act.
In the time which remains, I want to tum to the
controversy about arrangements compelling em­
ployees to belong to or to give Rnancial support to
unions and about the so-called right-to-work laws
which would forbid such arrangements. I say "so­
called" because such laws plainly do not give anyone
a right to work and because their exponents are gen­
erally silent about restrictions on occupational choice
unless such restrictions flow from arrangements fa­
vored by unions.
The controversy is so often confused by imprecise
rhetoric that it may be worth while to differentiate
the three principal arrangements involved.' First,
there is the closed shop, under which the employer
may hire and retain in his employ only employees
who are, and remain, members of the union involved.
Secondly, there is the traditional union shop, which
permits the hiring of non-union employees, but which
requires them to join the union within a specified
period and which also makes continued employment
dependent on retention of membership. Finally there
is the "Taft-Hartley" union shop. Under that statute,
as amended, a union which has majority support in
the unit and which has satisfied certain procedural
requirements may enter into an agreement requiring
all employees involved to pay periodic dues and uni­
form initiation fees within thirty days after their em­
ployment. The statute, however, confers on the states
the authority to prohibit even this limited arrange­
ment.
The closed shop plainly confers great powers on
the union and imposes corresponding limitations on
the freedom of both the employer and his employees,
present and prospective. The dependence of em­
ployment on union membership prevents manage­
ment, despite its responsibilities, from hiring those
whom it considers most qualified, only union mem­
bees-are eligible. This dependence also restricts the
occupational choices of members of the labor force
who are denied membership in the union involved
or who are unwilling to accept such membership. The
closed shop thus empowers the union to determine
how many and who shall work in the enterprises in­
volved, which may comprise substantially all of the
competitors in an industry or an area. Even the state
has refrained from seeking such powers in time of
peace, except in special areas such as the public utility
ReId.
The substantial powers conferred by the closed shop
can be, and have been, used for purposes which are
incompatible with the generally accepted values of
our society. For example, the closed shop can be,
and has been, used for private extortion schemes
whereby those in control of admissions to the union
impose stiff entrance fees on those who want to enter
a trade. It can be, and has been, used to implement
discrimination based on race, creed, or sex, as well as
arrangements for making certain jobs hereditary. It
can be, and has been, used to create or to intensify
labor shortages, thereby facilitating the exploitation
of consumers and of other workers, who are forced
into less attractive occupations. These consequences,
it is true, presuppose that the closed shop is coupled
with the wholly or partially closed union, and this
combination has been subjected to judicial limitations
in some jurisdictions which generally sanction the
closed shop. Such limitations raise the question of
whether the evils of the closed shop could be reme­
died by regulation without curtailing the benefits
which it allegedly creates-a question which I will
mention again later on.
Although I have referred to the monopoly dangers
of the closed shop, I want to note the danger of ex­
aggerating them. The closed shop is probably more
signiRcant as a reflection, than as a cause, of union
power. Generally, where a union is strong enough
to obtain a closed shop over a substantial segment
of an industry or over a Significant number of com­
petitors in a local market, it is also strong enough to
inflate the wage scale without recourse to the closed
shop. "Unduly high wages" indirectly result in the
restriction of entry into occupations which can be
achieved directly by the closed shop. Nevertheless,
the direct control over the number of entrants con­
ferred by the closed shop facilitates both the restric­
tion of entry and exaction of high rates on behalf of
those permitted by the union to engage in a particu­
lar occupation.
Even though such permission has been granted, it
can be withdrawn since under a closed shop contract
employees expelled from the union forfeit their jobs.
As a result, such a contract vests the union with far­
reaching control over its members' activities on and off
the job. This power may be, and has been, used to
discipline not only wildcat-strikers and strike-breakers,
but also members who are critical of union policies
or of corruption by union officials or who refrain from
paying assessments to support union legislative pro­
posals which they personally oppose.
The foregOing criticisms of the closed shop have
been met by a defense which rests on the following
principal grounds:
( 1) The closed shop gives the union needed and
desirable security against anti-union attacks by em­
ployers, disruptive factionalism within the union's
own ranks, and raids by rival unions. As a result, the
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union can be more "responsible" both in its demands
and in disciplining workers who engage in activities,
such as wildcat strikes, which are inconsistent with
plant discipline and orderly collective bargaining.
(2) It permits the union to see to it that employees �
have the skills necessary for the jobs involved.
( 3) It makes possible an adjustment of the supply
of workers to the "need for them."
( 4) Most unions have used their powers "respon­
sibly"; some employers have, indeed, found those
powers useful in promoting plant discipline and
stability.
I find these arguments unpersuasive as to unions
which enjoy the protection conferred by the Taft­
Hartley Act or similar protection under state law.
Despite the inherent imperfections of such legal pro­
tections, they present a substantial obstacle to union­
busting techniques on the part of employers and
represent, in the main, a reasonable balance between
free employee choice and stability for the bargaining
representative. To the extent that changes in the
details of such protective regulation are required, they
should be effected within the general regulatory frame­
work and scarcely justify the closed shop.
Nor is the closed shop necessary to Insure either
proper skill or discipline on the part of employees.
As to discipline, the employer, if he is not unduly
restricted by the union, has in most cases the incentive
as well as the authority to take appropriate action,
And even if an occasional employer should wish help
from the union, his desires should not be more con­
trolling than the union's, in view of the other interests
involved. Similarly, the employer's self-interest can
generally be relied on to insure employees of requisite
skill. Where, however, the public interest requires
additional control, the appropriate remedy would ap­
pear to be regulation by politically responsible"
authority rather than by private groups. This point is
equally applicable to regulation of the supply of
particular workers.
Finally, neither experience nor analysis supports the
view that "union responsibility" can be relied on to
avoid abuse of the broad authority granted by the
closed shop. This authority is too closely related to the
union's power interests and its drive for maximizing
the gains of its members to be kept in check by an
amorphous concept of responsibility which, except in
a small and ill-defined category of cases, is not backed
up by legal sanctions. We have not, in general, relied
on "employer responsibility" or the "corporate con­
science" to curb business conduct which threatens
important interests. There is no reason for being more
sanguine about the effectiveness of "union respon­
sibility."
Other students of the problem have been equally
distrustful of union self-regulation in an area which
invites exploitation of the public and tyranny over
individual employers. But they have urged that regula�
tion rather than prohibition, is the answer. Although
I lack the time to argue the point, I believe that such
regulation would adequately protect the interests
involved only if it in substance denied the powers
flowing from the closed shop. It seems to me more
efficient to deny such powers directly by proscribing
that arrangement. This suggestion is, however, sub­
ject to a qualification, which I will develop in a
moment.
This traditional union shop does not require union
membership as a condition of hire, but does require
employees to join the union within a specified period
after they are employed, and to retain their member­
ship thereafter. This arrangement theoretically does
not limit the employer's right to select his employees
and imposes a much gentler restriction on occupational
choice. Nevertheless, if the break-in costs for new
employees are high, and if it is likely that unions will
exercise their expulsion power after entry, employers
will be reluctant to hire new employees without union
clearance. Under such circumstances, the union shop
would be the closed shop by another name.
It seems unlikely, however, that this theoretical dan­
ger has been a real one. In the mass production indus­
tries, the traditional union shop has apparently not
been used to achieve indirect control over the hiring
process. And in other industries, there has been little
occasion to resort to such indirection since generally,
although not always, both the closed shop and the
traditional union shop have been legal or illegal.
Even if the danger of indirect control over hiring
is dismissed as imaginary, the traditional union shop
suffers from the objection that it gives the union far­
reaching power over the lives of the employees after
they have been employed. This is true because their
continued employment is dependent upon their con­
tinued membership in the union. Some unions have
established internal procedures designed to prevent
abuses of this power, and the courts have sought to
subject it to a concept of due process. But the pos­
sibilities for substantial abuses which remain suggest
that the traditional union shop, like the closed shop,
should remain illegal-provided that the protections
of the Taft-Hartley Act, or similar protections, are in
effect.
This proviso is an important one. In the absence of
such protection of organizational interests, the em­
ployer is privileged to frustrate the employees' free
choice by tactics that are a sorry chapter of our
history. Under such circumstances, the argument that
the arrangements we have examined are necessary for
union security are appealing despite the fact that such
arrangements may be used to exploit the public and to
tyrannize the employees.
Vol. 7, No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 53
There is another qualification of my position con­
cerning the closed and traditional union shop. It enter­
prises in particular industries or in any given labor
market were evenly divided between open shops and
closed shops, I doubt that there would be any case for
prohibiting either the closed or union shop. Under
such circumstances, the monopoly problem associated
with the closed shop would be obviated by cornpeti­
tive pressures from open shops. Workers, moreover,
could pick the closed or the open shop according to
their individual preferences. The existence of these
alternatives and the discipline of competition would
justify state abstention from the regulation of the
terms of collective bargaining agreements. But this
diversity of employment opportunities is not suffi­
ciently wide-spread to make this qualification relevant
to current problems of labor policy.
The Taft-Hartley-union shop, unlike the two other
arrangements, conditions employment, not on con­
tinued union membership, but only on financial sup­
port of the bargaining agent. This is a significant
difference because it operates to minimize limitations
both on the employer's freedom to select his employees
and on the employees' personal freedom. It also limits
the need for state interference in the union's internal
affairs.
I shall not spell out the competing arguments con­
cerning the desirability or prohibiting even this limited
form of compulsion. You probably have heard them
all. I will merely describe the basis for my conclusion
that the Taft-Hartley union shop is a reasonable com­
promise, which should not be superseded by the en-.
actment of so-called right to work laws. As I develop
my position, you will notice that abstract arguments
about the right to join or to stay out of associations
seem to me less persuasive than judgments about the
distinctive character of the community which we call
the ba�'gaining unit and about the prerequisites for
orderly collective bargaining.
We have already seen that under the majority rule
principle the bargaining representative has exclusive
bargaining authority, subject, however, to a duty to
represent all members of the unit fairly. It is that
principle which involves the fundamental limitation on
the freedom of the dissenting minority in the organ­
ized plant-a limitation more drastic than that imposed
by the share-the-cost principle of the Taft-Hartley Act.
This fundamental limitation is tolerable because
majority rule is necessary for stable and orderly collec­
tive bargaining, and collective bargaining has im­
portant values which. the community wishes to pre­
serve. The continuing authority and responsibility of
the bargaining agent with respect to all members of
the unit, justifies, I believe, the requirement that all
of them should pay a fair share of the cost. It is
unreal to require the representative to treat all mem-
bel'S of the unit fairly and at the same time to free the
non-union minority 'from any financial responsibility.
More concretely, it is unreal to require the union as
bargaining agent to process the grievances of non­
union employees, sometimes at considerable expense,
and to protect their interests in collective bargaining,
while freeing them from any financial obligation.
Such a result is not justified by the general argument
that the right to association includes the right to with­
draw or to withhold financial support. The union as
bargaining agent is not like the ordinary association
from which a member can depart at will. The anti­
union or non-union employee, so long as he remains
employed in the unit is, to repeat, subject to the bar­
gaining agent's authority and is entitled to fair repre­
sentation. In this context, the usual right to withdraw
from a voluntary association is scarcely relevant, let
alone controlling.
You may, of course, suggest that the theoretical duty
of fair representation is not in practice realized as to
non-union employees and that their grievances and
interests are neglected. Arbitrators dispute that gener­
ality and point to cases where unions have fought the
battles of non-unionized members of the unit. There
are many motivations for such battles. The interests
of union employees may call for vigorous protection
of the non-union ones. The bargaining agent may wish
to earn the good-will of non-union employees in the
hope that they will become members or at least
abandon active hostility or any disposition to join a
rival. And the bargaining agent may be moved by the
ethical and legal obligation represented by the duty
of fair representation.
In any event, the law does, and should continue to,
impose the duty of fair representation notwithstanding
the obstacles to its full discharge in favor of non­
union employees. A coherent labor policy would
scarcely be advanced by ignoring that duty when the
issue is that of fairly allocating the costs incurred by
the bargaining agent.
The argument I have made for the Taft-Hartley
union shop is not the conventional argument that the
non-union employees benefit from union activities and,
accordingly, should pay a fair share of the cost in­
volved in getting union benefits. The benefit argu­
ment is, of course, open to question. Perhaps non­
union employees have the initiative, the industry and
the skill which would bring them more rewards,
psychic and financial, than they get under collective
bargaining. Perhaps, in a given situation collective
bargaining produces no benefit for any employee. On
the other hand, perhaps non-union employees do bene­
fit and are merely playing the paying members for
suckers. In any event, the paying members will feel
like suckers and the resultant bitterness may add to
the difficulty of achieving the statutory objectives of
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protecting the employment of the non-union minority
and of insuring that they are fairly represented.
Let me turn to two considerations which complicate
my argument. First, union dues are used to finance
activities which are remote from collective bargaining
and which also may be opposed by employees forced
to finance them. I refer primarily to political activities
and related activities by which unionism seeks to affect
governmental action and to advance its idea of the
good society. I recognize that the problem here is
especially acute for the non-union member, who lacks
even the theoretical possibility of shaping the union's
official position. But the problem is also important for
employees who belong to the union because of its
bargaining activities and in spite of its political ac­
tivities. The problem involved thus affects all who
finance union activities, and it should, I believe, be
handled as a general problem, rather than by way of
a prohibition of the Taft-Hartley union shop.
The second complication is union corruption, which
is now being urged as an independent reason for such
a prohibition. Compulsory dues naturally aggravate
the corruption problem because they increase the loot
and reduce the ability of members or dues payers to
protest by withholding financial support. But, again,
corruption is a general problem affecting both the
majority and the dissenting minority. And, again, I
believe that is should be treated as a general problem
and should not be attacked by way of the Taft­
Hartley union shop.
Before concluding, I should like to make two general
points, which may help to put the right-to-work con­
troversy' in proper perspective. First, I doubt that
"right-to-work" laws are significant in relation to the
problems raised by the concentration of power in
centralized unions which can substantially influence
wage policies on an industry-wide basis. Union secu­
rity or compulsory union arrangements are, as I in­
dicated earlier, more significant as a consequence,
than as a cause, of such power. The railroad unions
are a case in point. Although the Railway Labor Act
until 1951 barred all such arrangements those unions
grew in numbers and did not lag behind in bargaining.
The legal remedies for the power of the centralized
national unions-if there are any wise remedies-will
have to be much more heroic than right-to-work laws.
Although the second point may sound ungracious,
it should not be suppressed. Exponents of "right-to­
work" laws should consider whether their insistence
on freedom of occupational choice and the dignity of
the individual may not be excessively specialized, To
take only one example, they may wish to consider the
relationship of restrictive employer hiring policies as
well as FEPC legislation to the symbol of individual
freedom which they invoke. Otherwise, they will be
open to one of two unpleasant charges: First, that they
are exploiting our traditions of freedom merely to
snipe at the union movement; or, secondly, that they
are blindly ignoring the many areas of economic life
where the protection of the dignity of the individual
is stilI unfinished business and where some employers
are not using their economic and moral power to get
on with the job.
Class of 1938-
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de Legislation Comparee, France; and International
Institute of Public Finance, Paris.
Bert Ganzer presently is Supervising Investigator
for the United States Civil Service Commission. He
was Military Government Court Officer in Germany
for two years.
Others of us occasionally have been active in gov­
ernment work. Quintin Johnstone was attorney for
the OPA; John R. Canright was Deputy Attorney
General for the Territory of Hawaii for six years;
Henry Hill was in the General Counsel's Office of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in Washington for five
years; Franz Joseph has been General Counsel and
Director of American Council of NATO; Governor
of the Atlantic Union Committee; and Chairman of
the American European Foundation. Willis Parkin­
son has been Special Agent for the FBI. John Lynch
has occasionally served as Special Judge; Frank Mahin
is Police Judge at Pewee Valley, Kentucky.
Our legal ability is evidenced by our success in
staying out of the army. Fifty percent of us success­
fully evaded (or do I mean avoided?-we never did
get to Income Taxes in Prof. Crosley's course on Tax­
ation) military service. Those of us who did serve,
did so with distinction. Dick Mullins, Bob Hay­
thorne and John Canright achieved the rank of Lt.
Colonel; Mel Cohen and Walter Berdal were Majors;
Art Sachs, Sheldon Bernstein and Roger Baird were
Lieutenants in the Navy; Tom Megan was Captain
and Battery Commander in Hawaii, the Philippines
and Okinawa. Irwin Askow also achieved the rank
of Captain. The overall average was dragged down
somewhat by a couple of clods like Jim Stevens and
Maury Rosenfield. who never got above the rank of
Private, but the overall picture was good.
We have been reasonably active in civic and pro­
fessional affairs; Robert Macdonald was a member
of the Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Asso­
ciation for two years and Chairman of the Entertain­
ment Committee of the Chicago Bar Association;
Frank Mahin is Elder and Clerk of the Session of the
Pewee Valley Presbyterian Church; Henry Hill is a
member of the Board of Education of School District
No. 34 in Glenview, Illinois; Richard Mullins has been
a member of the Board of Park Commissioners and
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of the City Planning Commission of Wichita; Lee'
Shaw was Chairman of the Grievance Committee and
a member of the Board of Managers of the Chicago
Bar Association; Franz Joseph has been Chairman of
the Committee on Naturalization and Confiscation
of the International Bar Association and on the Com­
mittee on Extraterritorial Application of Taxes of the
American Bar Association; Zalmon Goldsmith has
been President of the Kane County Bar Association,
Vice President of the Aurora Bar Association, Presi­
dent of the Aurora YMHA, Chairman of the Aurora
Committee for Constitutional Revision, Chairman of
the Aurora Red Cross First Aid Committee, and
Chairman of the Professional Division of the Aurora
Community Chest; Irwin J. Askow has been Librar­
ian, Member of the Board of Managers and Chairman
of the Public Relations Committee of the Chicago
Bar Association; John R. Canright has acted as Direc­
tor and Secretary of the Lanikai Association, Oahu;
John Lynch has acted as School Attorney for the
City of Lafayette, and Officer of the Crown Point
Lowell Bar Association; Walter Berdal is Warden of
his Church; Harry Kalven, Jr., is a member of the Illi­
nois Supreme Court Committee of Jury Instructions;
Marcus Cohn has been Chairman of the Committee
on Cooperation of the Examiners of the FCC Bar
Association, on the Legislative Committee of his PTA
and Precinct Chairman for the Democratic Party;
Richard James Stevens has been a Member of the
Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Association
and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the First
Unitarian Church of Chicago.
A couple of us have done some writing in the legal
field. Franz Joseph has published articles on Discre­
tionary Trusts, Domicile and Residence, Organizing
International Businesses, International Aspects of Na­
tionalization, Income Tax Treaties, Death Tax Trea­
ties, Estates of Aliens; and Foreign Sales. Harry
Kalven, Jr., is working on a case book on Torts and
is co-author of "The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation."
We seem to be a sedantary group. About the only
one who has revealed any activity in sports is Irwin
J. Askow who was Chicago City Champion in the
Squash Racquets B League. Walter Berdal has devel­
oped a considerable, interest in astronomy and is a
member of the Atlanta Astronomy Club; and Richard
James Stevens was one of the winners of the Chicago
Bar Association Duplicate Bridge Tournament two
years in a row. Other than that, we seem to have
kept our eyes glued to the TV Sets.
Melvin Cohen summed it up pretty well with his
remark "I claim to be a successful father." All in all,
we may not have set the world on fire, but have be­
haved ourselves reasonably well.
Fred L. Strodtbeck
Kalven-
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once again the result is to add a degree of freedom to
the jury, leaving them without even the guide that
recent roughly comparable cases might offer.21
Finally, there is one point at least on which in­
structions might be much improved. This is the han­
dling of the reduction to present value Iormula.P In
the case of serious disability or death of a relatively
young wage earner the discount is of course very
substantial. The point is a notably subtle one to
convey quickly to the layman not already familiar with
it and we can be certain it is not conveyed by a mild
reference to limiting the award to "the present value
of the losses." Our study has at least one example
where a serious split in the jury on damages seems to
have arisen directly from the failure to make the dis­
count point effectively to the jury. The low and high
award factions as post trial interview disclosed were
in fact in virtual agreement separated simply by the
amount of the discount. Yet neither side recognized
this and they finally were forced to compromise the
difference.
It is true that in a carefully tried case counsel will
make the discount point and may well handle part of
the jury's difficulty by using annuity tables. This raises
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one last reflection on the problems of controlling the
jury on damages. Many trial courts tend to regard
themselves as in sort of a partnership with counsel in
the presentation of the case, and more particularly the
law, to the jury. Able closing arguments will sub­
stantially increase the communication of the relevant
law, and perhaps the chief hope of orienting the jury
on damages lies with counsel. And this in turn suggests
the query whether defense counsel have not despaired
too much of their potential for arguing damage points
with vigor. 23
II
If the jury writes the law of damages in personal
injury cases what kind of law does it write? The
question cannot perhaps be answered quite so bluntly.
But what can be noted with almost endless variation
and interest is the response of the jury's common
sense equity when confronted with the formal legal
rules. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, the jury pro­
vides a kind of legal litmus paper for testing and
illuminating the policy dilemmas concealed in our
general personal injury damage formula. The jury is
the most interesting of the critics of the law.24 What
emerges are not so much totally new points as old
points seen with a fresh emphasis. For the truth seems
to be not that the jury is at war with the law but that
its views are somewhat askew the traditional legal
norms. The jury agrees wholly with much of the law
but at times it makes distinctions the law chooses to
ignore and at times it ignores distinctions the law
chooses to make.
The Rrst point that impresses is simply how difficult
the job really is. The jury almost always is asked to
reach decision on imperfect, incomplete and conflict­
ing evidence. And to a stunning degree this is true
where future damages are claimed in the personal
injury action. Here the jury is asked to guess the
future. How long will plaintiff live? How quickly and
how fully will he recover? How long will he need
medical treatment? How long will the pain last? How
much will the dollar be worth ten years from now?
This ambiguity, as we have said, greatly increases the
jury's freedom and affords them the chance to use
their special equities, but it also disturbs them to de­
cide so much of a man's future fate. And more than
one jury has been puzzled as to why the future can­
not be left in the custody of the court to be adjusted
as the future events require much in the fashion of
alimony payments. In any event, the jury reminds us
that one of the great architectural rules of the per­
sonal injury damage law is the rule that the whole
controversy must be disposed of now, once and for
all.25
Almost every familiar rule appears immediately
more arresting when seen as the jury struggles with
it. Take first a rule which rarely reaches appellate
articulation but which faces the jury in virtually every
case. The rule is that issues of liability and issues of
damage are totally separate. If the trier is persuaded
that a preponderance, however narrowly, favors li­
ability he is then to award the full damages proved.
He is not, that is, to discount damages because of his
doubts as to liability. And equally, in a negligence
case at least, he is not to increase damages because of
his view of the degree of fault in the defendant's con­
duct. If we imagine for a moment a series of cases in
which the facts as to damages remain identical but
the facts as to liability range over the full and rich
possibilities of negligence,26 the legal view is that the
award should be constant throughout the series. The
jury's view is that these may be signiRcantly different
cases.
In a case such as Fuentes v. Tucker'" an echo of the
problem may reach the appellate court. Here in a
wrongful death action the defendant admitted liability
and sought unsuccessfully to keep out of the trial the
facts as to liability. On appeal the admission of this
evidence was challenged as error. The majority of the
California court speaking through Justice Gibson held
that such evidence, except as it might bear on dam­
ages, was irrelevant and its admission error, but af­
firmed the judgment for the plaintiff since there was no
evidence that the award itself was excessive. In a
concurring opinion Justice Carter with his usual vigor
disagreed that it was error at all and went close to the
heart of the matter. His statement is worth somewhat
lengthy quotation:
"The effect of the majority holding in this case is to deny
to an injured person the benefit of presenting to the trier of
fact the entire factual situation surrounding the accident out
of which the injury arose. It cannot be denied that either a
jury or a trial judge is more disposed to award a substantial
amount of damages in a case where the defendant is shown
to have been guilty of gross negligence and his conduct was
such as to indicate a reckless disregard for the safety of others,
than where the negligence amounted to only an error in judg­
ment. The present holding will make it possible for a defend­
ant who has been guilty of the most heinous kind of reckless
and wanton conduct, including intoxication, to conceal from
the trier of fact the extent of his culpability, and thereby gain
any advantage which might flow from the absence of such
disclosure. Theoretically and technically, and judged by aca­
demic standards, this practice may be justified, but when
gauged by actual experience in the administration of justice
it favors the worst offenders by permitting them to escape
from a larger award of damages which the trier of fact might
feel justified in awarding if the entire picture were presented.
This does not mean that a person injured as a result of the
negligence of another should receive more damages because
his tortfeasor was grossly and wantonly negligent than another
with like injuries whose tortfeasor was only slightly negligent.
But it simply recognizes the human tendency to weigh liability
against culpability. Since the law must be administered by
human beings, the effect of this tendency must be considered
as incidental to its administration. To argue to the contrary
requires a denial of the obvious.
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"Therefore, if I were disposed to hold, contrary to the"
weight of authority and the long settled rule in this state, that
it was error for the trial court to permit plaintiff to prove the
facts relating to defendant's negligence, I would be required
to hold that such error was prejudicial and compelled a re­
versal of the judgment. This conclusion would be required
because of the probability that the damage award was increased
as the result of the evidence erroneously admitted. If it cannot
be said that the effect of such evidence was to increase the
award of damages in this case, it likewise cannot be said that
such evidence would have the effect of increasing the award
of damages in any case. It must necessarily follow that the
admission of such evidence could not be prejudicial in any
case, and to hold its admission erroneous is as idle as fighting
a windmill."
Who has the better of the debate? Is the plaintiff
entitled to the full measure of jury justice or is he en­
titled, when control is feasible, only to what the formal
rule allows? I think Justice Carter is right about the
fact of jury behavior in such matters. And the argu­
ment for his policy conclusion is that since the plaintiff
has of necessity this jury bonus in the majority of cases
it is discriminatory to deprive him of it only in the
occasional case. In any event once more we have the
familiar problem. The rule is clear that punitive dam­
ages are not allowable in the ordinary negligence case
and I would suppose that Justice Carter would agr�e
that it is error to instruct a jury that they may be
given. Yet we are not so sure how we feel about the
rule, and once again may be willing to have the jury
modify the rule sub rosa.
The point is at least as interesting when the shoe
is on the other foot. Presumably a plaintiff with sound
damages and doubtful liability might attempt to stip- .
ulate damages and seek to contest only liability to
prevent the jury from discounting damages. In all
likelihood this is the far more frequent problem for
the jury; and our evidence in a variety of ways suggests
that the jury does discount. At times the discount may
reach the appellate court when it is the product of a
compromise between jurors favoring no liability and
jurors favoring liability with substantial damages. Oc­
casionally the damages may be clear enough to make
it evident that the verdict must have been reached by
compromise. The court may then find the verdict bad
either because inadequate or because the result of so
naked a compromise. But it is our impression that in
many cases the discount results from something more
subtle and impossible to detect in the verdict. The
jurors individually and within their own minds may
simply fuse the liability and damage issues sufficiently
to shade their estimates of the damages.
And finally and frequently the point may arise not
because the jury is so doubtful about defendant's con­
duct but because it feels that someone else was also at
fault and that the defendant should not bear the entire
burden. This is the source of its behavior when in the
teeth of the contributory negligence rule'" it neverthe-
less finds for the plaintiff but finds less. And this is
the route by which it not infrequently reacts to the
rules against imputing negligence. It does so not.by a
logic directly challenging the rule but by discounting
defendant's burden because he was not totally respon­
sible. Thus the jury law may look a good deal different
than the formal rule-and, it is important to note, not
always in the direction of favoring the injured victim.
We come then to a point of some general juris­
prudential interest. To what extent could the law, if
it would, recognize and legitimate the jury's rule in
these matters. Where contributory negligence is in
issue the law can do so by adopting a comparative
negligence formula. But it can hardly write a formula
that would accommodate the other distinctions the
jury sees-the subtle gradations of moral fault in de­
fendant's conduct or the ambiguities in the basic
evidence itself. And as to imputed negligence we may
again have the jury reaching a tolerable compromise
between the harsh old rule that barred the innocent
plaintiff altogether and the modem rule that perhaps
ignores too much the reality of the family as a unit
in litigation. 29
What has been said already makes it evident that
the jury also has a tendency to apportion fault and
hence damages among tortfeasors-that in brief the old
common law rule is as contrary to common sense as
it has long been thought to be. Thus in one of our
experimental jury sequences which involves two de­
fendants, the jury has been known to ask if it could not
award $5,000 against one defendant and $70,000
against the other. Certain of the modern apportion­
ment statutes would legitimate the jury's sense of the
equities. But in the absence of such legislation the
jury can "apportion" only when the other tortfeasor is
not party to the suit.
What is so impressive about the jury's equity often
is that its view is in fact the law in another state or
country or is at least a reform proposal that has ar­
ticulate spokesmen in the literature. And where it is
not, the reason is simply that the equity is too subtle
to be codified.
Many other examples of the jury's polite war with
the law could be offered. We touched on several in
Section I: the jury reaction to fees, interest, and taxes
are obvious examples. Let me consider briefly a few
others. The first is the jury response in the death action
of a young child. Today when the labor value of a
child is likely to be negligible and the costs of raising
him considerable the harsh fact is that strict obedience
to the legal rule means no damages. Yet the death of
a young child must be the most serious of all per­
sonal injury damage. Once again we reconcile the
formal rule with our conscience by relying on the jury
to not follow the rule fully. And the jury appears to
use some discretion. It does not attempt the heroic
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task of payi�-g the parents fully for their grief; it dis-
tinguishes clearly between killing the child and per­
manently disabling him. But it does honor the parents
grief somewhat. And once again this is perhaps a quite
tolerable solution of a difficult policy point on which
we are understandably reluctant to legislate.30
The second example is the collateral benefits rule.
n is widely recognized of course that this poses a
problem to which there is no altogether satisfactory
solution.P But what evidence we have suggests that
the jury does not like the rule. Their plaintiff sympathy
does not extend to compensating the plaintiff for a loss
which some other source has already made good. And
they recognize more instances of the issue than does
the formal law. In another of our experimental cases
the plaintiff is injured while driving as a passenger in
her employer's car. The suit is against the driver of
the other car and there is little to suggest negligence
on the employer's part. Yet a frequent theme in the
experimental jury deliberations is the likelihood that
the employer will do something for the plaintiff if
she cannot work as fully as before and that this
"something" ought to be considered in estimating how
much the defendant should pay. A similar notion ap­
pears in cases we have studied by post trial interview
where an elderly person with adult children has been
injured. Here the jury looks in part to the children
to supply support almost as though the plaintiff had
accident insurance. And then there is the case of the
attractive young widow whose damages were reduced
because the jury found her attractive. Their view as
disclosed in interview in brief was that a girl that at­
tractive would have no trouble in remarrying and if
she did not remarry it was pretty much her own fault
and a failure to properly mitigate damages.
The third example is closely related. It is the ob­
verse situation where the plaintiff has a family to
support. The law is clear that, death actions apart,
the tort is to the plaintiff and not to his family but
the jury is likely to keep the family very much in
mind. It is our impression that where the facts as to
liability and damages are ambiguous, damages are
likely to vary in accordance with the number of de­
pendents looking to the plaintiff for support. And this
may suggest one source of the jury's coolness toward
contributory negligence as a total defense. They may
often see it as imputing the plaintiff's negligence to
his family-a point which has been explicitly noticed
by commentators where the plaintiff is killed and the
question is whether his negligence bars the claim of
his survivors.F
I have not talked as yet about two other widely dis­
cussed examples; pain and suffering, and insurance.
Briefly our impressions is that the jury is less respon­
sive to pain and suffering than popularly supposed.
Its chief importance may well be in cases where the
accident was real and serious but where the other
damages do not somehow quite add up. Reverting
again to data from the experimental jury,.we have in­
stances where the degree of permanent disability is
very difficult to assess although the injury was gen­
uinely painful. Here a juror sometimes argues for a
given total by the twin position that either the dis­
ability may turn out to be serious in which case the
sum is justified or if it does not then no injustice is
done in treating the sum as recognition of the pain and
suffering.
Consider for the moment the well known McNulty
case'" where California Court affirmed a verdict of
$lOO,OOO on behalf of a double amputee who made a
quick recovery and was restored to his former job, in­
curring special damages of only $3,000. The court
justified the verdict as an award for impairment of
earning power since a man so handicapped might not
fare so well in the future whatever his present position.
Mr. Belli reads the case as an award "solely for pain
and suffering."34 I would incline to guess with Pro­
fessor Jaffe however that this is an example of the
jury reacting not to explicit pain and suffering but
simply to so gross a violation of plaintiff's bodily in-,
tegrity. I appreciate the thrust of Professor Jaffe's
carefully and sensitively stated challenge to the
premise. of such decisions. And perhaps the award is
excessive. But as long as we have a system of per­
sonal injury damage awards it would, I think, seriously
disturb us to place the plaintiff's damages at $3,000.
And I will add the brave guess that had plaintiff's ob­
jective losses been $50,000 he would not have re­
covered appreciably more.
Finally turning again to Professor Jaffe's heroic thesis
that it is unsound to recognize pain and suffering as
a head of damages. I would suggest that an explicit
change of the law to deny such damages might not
affect jury verdicts very much. The situation might
well turn out as it has with the death of the young
child. It is not likely to matter too much in the nor­
mal case where there are serious other damages and in
the special case like McNulty we are not likely to have
the courage to say the jury would be wrong in blink­
ing at the rule.
Finally a word about the jury and insurance. Of all
the points of "jury law" this has long been the most
widely recognized. There is familiar law on the
propriety of insurance questions on voir dire and on
admissibility of evidence of insurance for limited pur­
poses during trial. In states like Texas and Tennessee
there are even precedents that the mention of in­
surance in jury deliberations may impeach a verdict."
Certainly the prevalence of insurance has affected the
thinking of everyone about tort and the project will
report in some detail about its impact on the jury.
Thus there is evidence suggesting that the lawyer
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strategy on voir dire does not work; most of the jury
does not understand the point of the insurance ques­
tions. But they think there is insurance anyway. There
are interesting suggestions that some jurors, echoing
as it were Professor Ehrenzweig.P" see in the failure
to insure a kind of negligence. There is evidence that
the silent instruction on insurance leaves the jury in
the dark as to the propriety of considering it. There is
the appearance from time to time of the juror who is
explicitly concerned with the level of insurance pre­
miums.
But the points I should like to underscore here are
three. First that liability insurance, at least in auto
cases and for the business enterprise defendant, is
now so frequent that its impact on the jury is prob­
ably reduced. Second that it may have a somewhat
different relevance for jury thinking ondamages than
for their thinking about liability. There is the arrest­
ing suggestion in some of our data that the effect of
insurance may be not so much to inflate damages as
it is to persuade the jury that the full loss be placed
on the defendant. That is, doubts as to insurance are
likely to cause the jury to award . less than what it re­
gards as the adequate award, out of regard to the
burden it places on the defendant. And finally there
is the underlying premise which an occasional juror
puts into words. Insurance and ability to pay are
relevant only in the case of real doubt. There is no
simple jury rule that the insured defendant cannot
win. Rather it is that where there is doubt and con­
sequently the risk of injustice and error in deciding the
case either way, it is better to risk error against the'
insurance fund than against the injured plaintiff. The
result therefore is a subtle shift of the burden of proof,
particularly on damage issues, to the insurance fund.
This last observation invites a strong note of caution
as to what has been said in this section. I have been
reporting primarily on what the jury talks about'"
when confronted with the various damage issues. For
several reasons such data although relevant must not
be taken too literally as prediction of jury decision.
On many points we have at most suggestive anecdotes
not systematic data. Again what has been reported is
almost always the reactions of some individual jurors,
not the consensus of the jury as a whole and it is the
jury as a whole that makes the decision. The give and
take of the deliberation process and the requirement
of a group decision operates to limit greatly extreme
tendencies to do equity as one or two jurors may see
it. The jury is likely to be more conventional and in
accord with the law than is the individual juror. As
we shall note more fully in the next section, jury dis­
cussion is highly fluid, arguments are frequently ration­
alizations or rhetoric or face saving gestures making
possible changes in position and there may be a wide
gulf between the way the jury talks and how it finally
decides. The quest especially in damaging is, as we
have said, for the felt appropriate sum. An argument
about pain and suffering or children to support or
fees or insurance may supply a useful defense of a
position. But if that argument is made unavailable,
another is likely to take its place and the damage sum
remain unchanged. And to return to the moral of the
insurance example, the jury's special equities are likely
to come into play only where there is a gap of am­
biguity in the facts, where, that is, the controversy is
close to indeterminate. Then the jury may utilize the
freedom created by the doubt to add some equities the
law ignores.
III
Our third general point is to look at the damage
issue somewhat less from the viewpoint of the lawyer
and more as the student of behavior would see it.
The jury project has been a collaborative effort by
lawyers and social scientists and here we pick up their
emphasis. The difference is chiefly one of emphasis
however since their points will have their legal coun­
terpart.
The first general point is what we might call the
variance in jury verdicts. The experimental jury tech­
nique has made an important contribution here by
making it possible to try the same case several times
and compare the results. This is an opportunity the
legal system can very rarely provide and even when
it does it is always a somewhat different case on
retrial. The key point then is that if we run say ten
trials of the same personal injury damage case we
are very likely to get ten different results. And the
experimental jury results provide therefore direct ex­
perience with the range of possible verdicts in a given
case and also some sense of their relative probabil­
ity.38 This underscores the familiar point that jury
law is unstable and uncertain, and more important
it provides the proper intellectual model for thinking
about jury decision making. A jury verdict is simply
one of a series of possible verdicts for the single
case.P" And this in turn means that at most we should
talk of averages when we talk about jury tendencies.
The first point then is simply that this is the way it
really is and that this variance is somewhat concealed
from our normal view of the jury by the fact that
we try the case only once.
But from a slightly different standpoint this aver­
aging process is quite familiar to the trial lawyer. It
makes explicit what he must in part be conSidering
when he evaluates a case for settlement.s" If he says
a case is worth $20,000 he means not that a jury will
invariably give $20,000 and, if he is very thoughtful
about it, not that any jury will give $20,000. He means
rather that the average of a series of verdicts in this
case will be around $20,000 and that therefore he
runs the smallest risk of error in settling as against
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trial if he sticks to his $20,000 figure. Our first experi­
mental case supplied a vivid example of this. We
had taken our script from an actual case which was
settled just before the verdict for $42,000. We ran
ten experimental trials of the case; the verdicts ranged
from $17,500 to $60,000 with only one $42,000 verdict
and only one $40,000 verdict. Yet the average for the
ten cases was $41,000.41
The settlement process in personal injury cases is
an integral part of the total decision making institu­
tion; the vast majority of cases are disposed of by the
settlement mechanism; and jury law controls not
only the small minority of cases finally tried to verdict
but those settled as well since the yardstick for set­
tlement is the expectation of jury decision. And in
weighing such expectations the bar more 'or less ex­
plicitly recognizes that they are dealing with the aver­
age verdict in the individual case.
The source of this variability in verdict is two fold.
It results from the ambiguity of the facts and the law
which makes for difference in viewpoint, and from
the enormously wide public from which the jury is
recruited, which makes it likely that those different
viewpoints will be differentially represented on differ­
ent juries. In brief, particularly on issues of personal
injury damage the jury system puts to the public
precisely the kind of question on which differences
in background, temperament and experience are likely
to produce a difference in opinion. Or to put this
another way, it is still regarded as a somewhat refresh­
ing point to observe that changes in the personnel of
the United States Supreme Court may have some­
thing to do with changes in its decisions. But with
the jury we take for granted that personnel as well
as rule and tradition make a difference.
From the viewpoint of the social scientist the jury
offers a rich possibility for exploring further the corre­
lations between background and opinion, a topic of
wide general interest to him. We have talked thus
Far of the jury's sense of equity as though it were a
single uniform sentiment interestingly different from
the legal norm. But the truth of course is that so
heterogeneous a population as the American jury has
a great variety of sentiments on any given issue. And
it is therefore pertinent to see what can be learned
about what kinds of people have what kinds of views.
Roughly we can break our inquiry into two stages.
First what kind of background and experience will
dispose one individual juror to a given view at one
end of the trial and before the deliberation begins,
and second what kind of jurors will be influential in
the deliberation process where the view must weigh
if it is ever to matter to the result.
This is not the place to detail the results of our
inquiry. But this much might be emphasized. First,
we find repeated correlations between some back-
ground factors such as ethnicity and the jury's view­
point on damages in the particular case. Second, as
with the social sciences in general at this stage of
their development.t'' the factors which correlate best
are the demographic variables like ethnicity, occu­
pation, income, etc. But these are relatively crude
indices and do not contain on their face the explana­
tion for the correlation. Our quest for deeper factors
such as personality traits or basic sentiments which
would both explain more and correlate more tightly
has been only modestly successful. Third, we are
again speaking only of averages; there is great vari­
aticn within any general category of individuals. Thus
en the average, business men of Scandinavian origin
tend to be conservative on damages, but this or that
individual Scandinavian business man might be en­
thusiastically pro-plaintiff. Fourth, some juror types
who are most strongly pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant
are most easily influenced to change their views in
the deliberation process. But again the traCing of
juror influence in the deliberation is a subtle and
difficult matter. Fifth, we have made a special study
of the regional variations in awards which permits
us to make a fair map of the award "temperature"
in the United States. But once again the explanation
as to why different regions differ so much is hard
to comeby,
It should 1:)e abundantly clear by now that what
we talk of as correlations between demographic var­
iables and juror pre-deliberation bias is altogether
familiar to the trial bar however alien the vocabulary.
The institution of voir dire examination is the law­
yer's version of the same point. In his exercise of
peremptory challenges he is practicing the art of the
social scientist. One phase of our study is therefore
concerned with finding out what rules and hunches
the lawyer plays in actual practice and how closely
these check out with our own results. Suffice it here
to note that the lawyer has observed well and it is
somewhat a matter for mutual congratulation that our
results are so close to his; similarly our study of
regional variation has its obvious counterpart in the
migratory tort suit and here again the bar and we
are largely in agreement.
Men differ as jurors not only because of the differ­
ences in their backgrounds but also because of the
differences in their experience. One of the most inter­
esting chapters of the jury study concerns the juror's
use of extra-record information in the deliberation.
Whatever the law's interest in keeping the trial record
aseptic, it cannot in fact prevent the juror from aug­
menting it out of his own experience. Thus the rec­
ord is enlarged in the jury room by juror testimony.
And the documenting and inventorying of this addi­
tion to the record is a fascinating business indeed.
One recurring instance of this has special relevance
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for the damage issue. It concerns the juror's reactions
to medical testimony and to illness in general. It
may be as simple as the juror's identification with
the injured plaintiff where he himself or a close friend
or relative has experienced a comparable injury. The
bar has recognized this in its aphorism that the risk
of having the aged and infirm on the jury is that the
defendant will have to pay for their ills as well as
those of the plaintiff. It may take the form of grave
suspicion of ills less obvious than the broken leg, on
the general view that no one feels altogether healthy
anyway, or more concretely as in the case of a rail­
road man plaintiff where several jurors knew railroad
men intimately that no real railroad man would com­
plain about such minor ills. Or the very vagueness
of the ailment may turn in the jury's eyes into a guar­
antee of authenticity as in the case of a back ailment
where all the medical testimony tended to show that
the doctors could find nothing organically wrong.
In one such case which we studied through posttrial
interview a juror indicated that his mother had com­
plained of such an ailment for thirty years, that no
doctor had been able to find anything wrong, and
that he was certain his mother was not a hypochon­
driac. The jury faced with the delicate choice of
believing the plaintiff or of charging his mother as
a hypochondriac sided in the end with the plaintiff.
There remains then the pooling of individual juror
views in the deliberation process to yield the group
verdict. Here again the jury involves an important
area of research in contemporary social science-the
study of small group behavior. And here the blending
of the lawyer's perspective with its emphasis on the
logiC of argument with the social scientist's perspec­
tive with its emphasis on the social process of the
group has proved a considerable but a rewarding job.
The lawyer is likely to view the deliberation as simply
a formal debate; the social scientist is likely to view
it as group problem solving where everything but
the content of the problem is of interest.
The dynamics of group behavior in the jury room
is too complex a story to attempt here. The great
point is that a jury verdict is a group product, that
the jury is not simply an atomistic electorate, but
must work to a solution which is at least tolerable
to all twelve. One result is that the filtering of indi­
vidual eccentricity through the group process fur­
nishes a major safeguard in the jury system. It is
not merely that twelve heads may be better than one
but that a verdict hammered out as a group product
is likely to have important strengths.
We have anticipated in the prior discussion several
of the most important points about the jury's behavior
when it turns to the damage issue as a group. The
cardinal point is that the quest is more for the appro­
priate sum than for the summation of the specific
components. The impression, as already noted, is one
of considerable fluidity in argument-the sum is more
important than the arguments advanced on its behalf.
If this argument is disallowed another will take its
place. And one important reason the jury can reach
agreement is that it does not try for agreement on
all the subordinate premises. Juror A may rate pain
and suffering more important than Juror Band Juror
B may take disability as more substantial than Juror
A. They will air these differences, to be sure, in the
deliberation but they will not insist on their resolution
so long as by whatever route they can agree on the
overall sum.
One illustration of this will have to suffice. We
touched earlier on their view as to lawyer's fees as
damages. Do they actually award fees? The answer
is not simple. They frequently discuss them in the
deliberation. They see no impropriety in so doing.
They are frequently well informed, although not al­
ways, about the level of contingent fees today. Does
this then mean that awards are higher by the amount
of the fee? We seriously doubt it.43 First we virtually
never have a jury which after agreeing on the proper
damage figure then decides on the fee as a group and
adds it. We have some property damage cases where
the damage is more objectively set and in these the
jury does not consider the fee. And we have a variety
of suggestions that the fee point is used simply as a
device in argument to facilitate agreement. Perhaps
the most vivid illustration occurs in an experimental
jury deliberation where a majority of jurors finally
reach agreement on a sum which does not reflect fees.
In an effort to persuade one of the hold-out low award
jurors the point is made for the first time. The hold­
out agrees he has overlooked fees and raises his figure
accordingly. An over logical member of the majority
then asks about the majority adding fees to their
award and is quickly and decisively rebuffed.
The miracle of the jury is that it is somehow able
to reach agreement despite the divergent views with
which it enters the deliberation. This is the result
of many pressures including a great reluctance to fail
to do their job and have the jury hcmg. In part it is
the result of a decent respect for the opinions of others
on matters where certainty is hard to come by. In
part it is the result of a subtle shift in their own per­
ception of the facts as the deliberation continues.
We find with high frequency that a genuine con­
sensus has been reached at the end with the jurors
now preferring the jury verdict to their original posi­
tion. And finally in part it is the result of negotiated
compromise when argument can go no further.
We come then to the quotient verdict. Is the dam­
age award simply the quotient of the twelve indi­
vidual answers? Here again the answer is compli­
cated. The final awards will not infrequently come
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close to the original pre-deliberation averages for the
group. But this will often be the result even though a
quotient is never taken. There is a natural tendency
for the extremes to come toward the middle as the
range of positions is disclosed. The jury often takes
a quotient early as a guide but then goes on with its
deliberation. And in the cases where the quotient
is the final answer the compromise usually comes late
after a serious effort to bridge difficulties by other
means. The merit of a compromise verdict is thus
difficult to assess without knowing the full context
of the deliberation.
In general we have concealed from ourselves, the
difficult position in which the formal law may place
the jury. Surely there is nothing about the damage
issue in many personal injury cases which makes it
likely that twelve men acting seriously and in good
faith can reach full agreement on it. What do we then
want the jury to do? There are only two alternatives
left: negotiated compromise or a hung jury. The
practical jury almost always prefers the former with
the interesting result that the function of the jury in
the end may be not to adjudicate the case, but, as
it were, to settle it vicariously.
In any event, the nature of the damage question
permits the jury to behave differently than do the
yes/no issues of guilt and liability. It permits the
small adjustment, the slight shift and if necessary,
the full compromise which makes the verdict pos­
sible. The damage verdict therefore is especially
likely to reflect the composite view of the jury as a
group and not to be the product of the single strong
juror or the strong faction. Perhaps the legal system
should seek some way to avoid having questions of
such flexibility and indeterminacy arise, but so long
as it continues to furnish them the jury would seem
to provide remarkably congenial mechanism for their
official resolution.
And to return once more to pain and suffering.
Whatever else may be said for or against recognition
of it in damages, it does because of its ambiguity
provide a useful grease for the jury machinery.
IV
We have left to a brief postscript the consideration
of the parallel performance in comparable cases of
the judge. Logically perhaps, this is the first ques­
tion to ask about the jury-how differently do judge
and jury decide the same case. We are by no means
clear on how much like the judge and how different
from him we wish the jury to be. If it is too much
like the judge, the jury may lose all claim to a dis­
tinctive function. If it is too little like him we are
disturbed by how easily jury equity elides into jury
anarchy.
The question is specially pertinent for the personal
injury case where the jury is so widely thought, as
jury waiver ratios indicate, to favor the plaintiff. A
major segment of the jury project is devoted to a
survey in which trial judges have reported on a case
by case basis how they would have decided on bench
trial actual cases tried before them with a jury.v' Once
again the results indicate considerably more com­
plexity than the popular view supposes. I shall not
report that data here except to note two points. First,
the difference is not monolithic. While jury awards on
the average are higher than judge awards, there are
a surprising proportion of cases in which the judge
would have given more than the jury in fact did.
Second, the detailed profile of judge-jury differences
obtained from the survey gives us another perspec­
tive on the jury's sense of equity and the law's suc­
cess in controlling it.
The judge and jury are two remarkably different
institutions for reaching the same objective-fair im­
personal adjudication of controversies. The judge
represents tradition, discipline, professional compe­
tence and repeated experience with the matter. This
is undoubtedly a good formula. But the endless fasci­
nation of the jury is to see whether something quite
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different-the layman amateur drawn from a wide
J
public, disciplined only by the trial process and by
the obligation to reach a group verdict-can some­
how work as well or perhaps better. And in any event
in its persistent struggle to dispose of the difficult
issues our legal system gives it-among which meas­
uring personal injury damages occupies a prominent
place-the jury throws much light on the ultimate
issues of justice involved.
This article owes a major debt to the work of sev­
eral colleagues on the jury project; in particular to
Fred Strodtbeck, Hans Zeisel, Dale Broeder, and to
Allen Barton, Saul Mendlovitz, Rita James, and Philip
Ennis. Their work will in the reasonably near future
be published in its own right. The debt is to the stim­
ulus of innumerable discussions as well as to their
data.
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38 It is probable that the experimental jury tends to exaggerate
the variances somewhat for two reasons. First, our experimental
cases may be more ambiguous on their facts than many actual
jury cases; second, our experimental juries, although drawn
from actual jury pools, have not been subjected to voir dire
and include therefore relatively more jurors with extreme views.
39 The project has less direct evidence on the variance of bench
trial decisions, but it would appear that the model is equally
correct for the individual judicial decision.
40 Variance also provides the key rationale for the doctrine of
res judicata; see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 9
Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957).
it This raises the amusing point that a lawyer who refuses to
settle say, for $20,000 and is hit by a $40,000 verdict may in
fact have been more right than his opponent. It may however
be small comfort to him, or to his client, to realize that had the
case been tried over and over to eternity the average of all
verdicts would approximate $20,000.
42 See Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties
(1955); Blum and Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A
Lawyer's Appraisal of an Emerging Science, 24 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 1 (1956).
43 To balance the impressions here I should report a jury
anecdote I recently heard from a lawyer. The particular jury is
said to have begun its deliberation by deciding first on the
lawyer's fee and then multiplying it by three to get the dam­
ages. Occasionally an appellate judge will himself be explicit
about lawyers' fees when he is appraising whether a verdict is
excessive or not. In Renuert Lumber Yard, Inc. v. Levine, 49
So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950) where the court entered a remittitur of
$15,000 on a verdict of $75,000, Judge Hobson dissenting said
in part: "Moreover, although there is no legal basis for the in­
clusion of an attorney's fee in the judgment it is a matter of
common knowledge that in personal injury actions lawyers do
not customarily perform services for the plaintiff gratuitously.
As a practical proposition it is indeed probable that after paying
for the services of his attorney appellee would have little, if
any, of the $30,000 left . . . Such circumstances cannot be
ignored by the writer in performing his part of this appellate
court's duty to determine whether the judgment is so grossly
excessive as to shock the judicial conscience."
44 The survey is based on a nationwide sample of some 700 trial
judges and includes some 5000 actual jury trials. Roughly 1400
of these are personal injury cases. The results will be reported
out in detail in the publications of the Project.
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